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THE “SMART” FOURTH AMENDMENT
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson†
“Smart” devices radiate data, exposing a continuous, inti-
mate, and revealing pattern of daily life.  Billions of sensors
collect data from smartphones, smart homes, smart cars, med-
ical devices, and an evolving assortment of consumer and
commercial products.  But, what are these data trails to the
Fourth Amendment?  Does data emanating from devices on or
about our bodies, houses, things, and digital devices fall
within the Fourth Amendment’s protection of “persons,
houses, papers, and effects”?  Does interception of this infor-
mation violate a “reasonable expectation of privacy”?
This Article addresses the question of how the Fourth
Amendment should protect “smart data.”  It exposes the grow-
ing danger of sensor surveillance and the weakness of current
Fourth Amendment doctrine.  The Article then suggests a new
theory of “informational curtilage” to protect the data trails
emerging from smart devices and reclaims the principle of
“informational security” as the organizing framework for a
digital Fourth Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
“Smart” devices radiate data.1  From smartphones, fitness
trackers, enchanted pill bottles, smart cars, and even smart
refrigerators, these objects create extensive data trails re-
vealing personal information, patterns, and activities.2  But,
1 “Smart device” is a generic term for digitally enhanced objects that allow
communication between the object and a sensor device. See generally Meg Leta
Jones, Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People’s Things, 51 IDAHO L.
REV. 639, 641–45 (2015) (describing development of smart things, smart people,
and smart spaces).
2 See infra Part I.
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what are these data trails for Fourth Amendment purposes?
Are they part of the “persons,” “houses,” “papers,” or “effects”
mentioned in the Fourth Amendment’s text?3  Does intercep-
tion of such data violate a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy?4  Do data trails simply fall outside of the Fourth
Amendment’s protection?
Part commodity, part property, and part expression, this
smart data has become quite valuable to commercial marketers
who track us for consumer purposes.5  For law enforcement,
such data trails will be similarly valuable to track and investi-
gate suspects involved in criminal activity.6  Geolocation can
undermine an alibi or tie a suspect to a crime scene.7  Health
data can report elevated blood pressure consistent with drug
use or physical assault.8  A Ford automotive executive once
admitted, “We know everyone who breaks the law, we know
when you’re doing it.  We have GPS in your car, so we know
what you’re doing.”9  The revealing power of smart devices for
law enforcement will only continue to grow in sophistication
and scope as more and more devices become connected via the
“Internet of Things.”10
3 The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
5 Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Man-
aging Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 93 (2014).
6 Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934,
1936, 1940 (2013) (recognizing that the Internet of Things will subject “previously
unobservable activity to electronic measurement, observation, and control”).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (involving the
tracking of a narcotics suspect via a GPS device attached to his car).
8 Peppet, supra note 5 (“[A] fitness monitor’s separate measurements of heart
rate and respiration can in combination reveal not only a user’s exercise routine,
but also cocaine, heroin, tobacco, and alcohol use, each of which produces unique
biometric signatures.”).
9 Jim Edwards, Ford Exec: ‘We Know Everyone Who Breaks the Law’ Thanks
to Our GPS in Your Car, BUS. INSIDER, (Jan. 8, 2014, 8:16 PM), http://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/ford-exec-gps-2014-1#ixzz3f7sNp0s8 [https://perma.cc/DXV2-
XJCU]; see also Stephen E. Henderson, Our Records Panopticon and the American
Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 699, 705 (2014)
(observing that car manufacturers such as Ford are not the only ones accumulat-
ing data while you drive).
10 The term “Internet of Things” was coined by Kevin Ashton. See Kevin
Ashton, That “Internet of Things” Thing, RFID J. (June 22, 2009), http://www
.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986 [https://perma.cc/R9S3-LEC8]; see also
Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Protecting Privacy in a
Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581, 1599 (2014) (“The ‘Internet of
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The resulting web of sensors raises difficult questions
about what data trails are for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”11  So the question be-
comes, is the data trail from an implanted “smart” heart moni-
tor protected as part of the “person” as understood in the
Fourth Amendment?  Is the engine data emitting from a smart
car analytically distinct from the “effect” that is the car?  Is a
digital business record any different from the physical docu-
ment that might otherwise fall under the “papers” protection of
the Fourth Amendment?  Do these data streams deserve pro-
tection under a “reasonable expectation of privacy theory”12 or
some other theory?
This Article examines the question of what smart data is for
Fourth Amendment purposes.  This question matters because
“what something is” and “where it is located” are fundamental
to answer the threshold question of whether there has been a
Fourth Amendment search.13  Data—the ones and zeros of bi-
nary code—have been the subject of some jurisprudential ex-
ploration when it lies stored within a computer, smartphone, or
other electronic device.14  Data trails—the emitting digital in-
Things’ is the newest wave in ubiquitous computing, a term used to describe the
array of internet-enabled devices (like cars and traffic lights but also coffee pots
and clothes) that are entering our everyday lives. These devices not only collect
increasingly specific personal information; but they also can share that data with
other people and other devices.”); Neil Gershenfeld & JP Vasseur, As Objects Go
Online: The Promise (and Pitfalls) of the Internet of Things, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar./
Apr. 2014, at 60, 64–65, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140745/neil-
gershenfeld-and-jp-vasseur/as-objects-go-online [http://perma.cc/2EMP-
EXKL]; Timothy B. Lee, Everything’s Connected: How Tiny Computers Could
Change the Way We Live, VOX (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.vox.com/2014/5/8/
5590228/how-tiny-computers-could-change-the-way-we-live  [http://perma.cc/
EE2L-49QD].
11 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, supra note 3.
12 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
13 See James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth
Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 324–26 (2002) (discussing
the importance of threshold determinations).
14 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480–81 (2014)
(smartphones); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (e-
mail); United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2008) (computer),
amended by and reh’g denied, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008) (“A cell phone is similar to a personal
computer that is carried on one’s person . . . .”); United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d
990, 994 (9th Cir. 2006) (laptop); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270
(10th Cir. 1999) (computer); United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936
(W.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that the “Fourth Amendment protection of closed com-
puter files and hard drives is similar to the protection it affords a person’s closed
containers and closed personal effects”). See generally Orin S. Kerr, Searches and
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formation or signals from smart devices—have not been simi-
larly discussed.  Yet, because this information contains
continuous, private, and revealing insights about our daily
lives, these data trails may be as sensitive as stored data.  If
data trails lie outside the Fourth Amendment, then law en-
forcement can track this revealing network of information with-
out any constitutional limit.  If data trails are protected by the
Fourth Amendment, a new constitutional framework needs to
be developed to define this protection.
This Article proposes a response to the rise of “sensorveil-
lance”—the ever-increasing ability for surveillance technologies
to track individuals through the data trails they leave behind.15
According to recent predictions, by the year 2020, between
50–75 billion devices worldwide will be connected by the In-
ternet of Things.16  Many of those American smart devices will
be built within our homes, cars, personal property, and even
implanted in our bodies.17  By design, each of those smart de-
vices will reveal digitized information about the user, and will
be networked in an ever-growing web of sensors and collection
systems.  Some devices will be relatively sophisticated, en-
crypted sensors.  Other devices will be cheap, unprotected sen-
sors.  Many will be interoperable, and others automatic,
usually emitting data without the user’s knowledge or control.
But, all of them raise fundamental Fourth Amendment ques-
tions of how to protect personally revealing digitized clues
about an individual’s actions and life patterns.
Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 542 (2005) (noting that com-
puters store “a tremendous amount of information that most users do not know
about and cannot control”).
15 The term “sensorveillance” owes its inspiration to the term “dataveillance.”
M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technology
Scholarship, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 809, 822 (2010) (“Richard Clarke coined the
term ‘dataveillance’ to describe the systematic observation, collation, and dissem-
ination that modern computing make possible.”); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE
DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 33 (2004) (describ-
ing dataveillance as “a method of watching not through the eye or the camera, but
by collecting facts and data”); Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet
Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
261, 270–73 (2008) (describing data mining practices of private companies).
16 Tony Danova, Morgan Stanley: 75 Billion Devices Will Be Connected to the
Internet of Things by 2020, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2013, 4:16 PM), http://www
.businessinsider.com/75-billion-devices-will-be-connected-to-the-internet-by-
2020-2013-10 [https://perma.cc/BWT2-GV36] (“Cisco thinks about 50 billion
devices will be connected by 2020, after coming out with an earlier analysis in
January that claimed 8.7 billion connected devices in 2012. A separate analysis
from Morgan Stanley feels that number can actually be as high as 75
billion . . . .”).
17 See infra Part I.
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The Supreme Court has only begun to explore the question
of whether the Fourth Amendment needs a new digital under-
standing.  In Riley v. California, the Court wrestled with the
status of data in smartphones searched incident to arrest, pro-
viding early hints of how digital information should be treated
under the Fourth Amendment.18  Similarly, in United States v.
Jones, five concurring Justices recognized the need to protect
long-term, aggregated, geolocational data trails obtained
through warrantless GPS surveillance.19
This Article seeks to expand on these tentative first steps
and examine how data trails from smart objects should be
considered under the Fourth Amendment.20  This Article has
three major goals.  First, the Article seeks to situate the discus-
sion of smart data in a larger discussion of “sensorveillance”—
the rise of new surveillance technologies built within a
networked world.  Second, the Article seeks to explore the po-
tential coverage and practical gaps of current Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine as applied to the problem of data trails.  Third,
the Article offers a new theory “informational curtilage” as a
workable analytical framework to approach data trails under
the Fourth Amendment.
In examining the problem of data trails, this Article high-
lights that the Fourth Amendment—at its core—protects “in-
formational security,” as much as persons, property, papers, or
privacy.21  Underlying the protection of persons, papers,
homes, and effects and behind the expectation of privacy lies a
desire to guard personal information from government intru-
sion.  In other words, it is not the corporal person, alone, that
deserves protection, but also the information about the person.
It is not the sheaf of papers, but the revealing personal details
in those words that matter.  It is not the physical home that is
as important as what happens in the home.  Data trails, be-
cause they are pure information, crystalize this insight.  While
privacy scholars and Fourth Amendment scholars have recog-
nized this reality,22 informational security has not registered
18 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
19 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
20 In a companion article, I approach the same puzzle of how to apply the
Fourth Amendment to the Internet of Things from a “thing-based perspective.”
See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment
of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 809–11, 825 (2016).
21 See infra Part III for a definition and examination of “informational
security.”
22 E.g., James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645,
667 (1985) (“The constitutional text, structure, and history, as well as early fourth
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significantly in Supreme Court cases or lower court judicial
analysis.  This Article begins the process of reclaiming this in-
sight by focusing on the problem of pure data trails among the
Internet of Things.
Part I of the Article details the development of the Internet
of Things.  While still in its infancy, the rise of new surveillance
techniques through cheap and ubiquitous sensors is growing
across the technological landscape.  From the Internet of
Things to the “Quantified Self,” data trails offer new ways to
investigate and monitor individuals suspected of crime.  Part II
of the Article examines the gaps in existing Fourth Amendment
doctrine.  As currently applied, the legal framework does not
answer the question of data trails from smart devices.  While
insights and arguments can be drawn from precedent, real
gaps remain.  Part III of the Article argues that despite the gaps,
a strong argument can be made to protect certain data trails
among the Internet of Things.  By examining the commonalities
of why certain objects, places, and things are constitutionally
protected, this section argues for a new protection based on the
concept of informational security.  Part IV operationalizes that
argument into a new theory of “informational curtilage,” that
builds off a traditional Fourth Amendment concept of physical
“curtilage.”23  This theory offers a solution to the challenges of
sensorveillance and provides a conceptual framework to re-
solve other gaps in existing Fourth Amendment doctrine.
amendment cases, support the conclusion that the main reason for constitution-
alizing informational privacy is its instrumental role as a medium within which
other rights and interests can survive, even flourish.”); Richard C. Turkington,
Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitu-
tional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479, 492–94 (1990) (“[I]t
is useful and appropriate to speak of [F]ourth [A]mendment restraints on govern-
ment action in particular cases as expressions of the constitutional right to infor-
mational privacy.”); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1461, 1463 (2000); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737,
740 (1989); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2056, 2058 (2004); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,
52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1659–66 (1999); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:
Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV.
1393, 1398 (2001).
23 See infra Part IV.
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I
“SMART” DEVICES AMONG THE INTERNET OF THINGS
“Smart” devices communicate data to sensor systems de-
signed to collect information.24  Smart devices include sophisti-
cated, computer-like handheld devices (iPhones, tablets) and
simple, single-use RFID chips (clothing tags).25  Smart systems
can include large-scale, interconnected industrial infrastruc-
ture capable of running a major manufacturing plant26 or free-
floating “smart dust” the size of actual dust particles.27  But,
whether big or small, simple or sentient,28 these smart things
all create and communicate data designed to be collected by
other smart things.  This section briefly describes the growth
and promise of smart devices among the “Internet of Things”29
and then describes the potential perils of sensor surveillance.
24 No single agreed-upon definition exists about the term “smart device.”
Used here, the term signifies a generic device that has digital communication
capabilities with other sensors.
25 Smart devices can include smart computer-like devices such as iPads,
iPhones, Kindles, Apple Watches, etc.  RFID chips involve a much lower capacity
sensor with much fewer capabilities.  Nancy J. King, When Mobile Phones Are
RFID-Equipped—Finding E.U.-U.S. Solutions to Protect Consumer Privacy and Fa-
cilitate Mobile Commerce, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 107, 143–44 (2008)
(“If the information stored on an RFID-tagged consumer item is unique to the
particular item, it can be used to distinguish the person carrying the item from all
other persons and thus be used to track the person carrying the RFID-tagged
item.”).
26 Chloe Green, The Internet of Things Business Process Revolution, INFORMA-
TION AGE (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.information-age.com/it-management/
strategy-and-innovation/123458453/internet-things-business-process-revolu-
tion [https://perma.cc/2F5Q-SF6A].
27 John D. Sutter, ‘Smart Dust’ Aims to Monitor Everything, CNN (May 3,
2010, 8:27AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/05/03/smart.dust.sensors/
index.html [https://perma.cc/SE6E-FHC5]; Rebecca Rubin, Note, Smart Dust:
Just A Speck Goes A Long Way in the Erosion of Fundamental Privacy Rights, 15 J.
High Tech. L. 329, 342 (2015) (“The Smart Dust project, created by researcher
Kris Pister in the 1990s, reflects his previously only-imagined idea of a world of
constant monitoring through the use of countless tiny sensors sprinkled upon the
Earth.  Pister . . . created smart dust, a micro-millimeter scale technology capable
of both military and commercial application for sensing vibrations, temperatures,
sounds, and lighting, among other elements.”).
28 Richard L. Rutledge et al., Defining the Internet of Devices: Privacy and
Security Implications, Georgia Institute of Technology Technical Report GIT-GVU-
14-01, https://smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream/handle/1853/52020/plsc2014-
IoD.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/89KH-6NGB] (discussing a refrigerator
that will order milk for you when you run out).
29 A Sea of Sensors, THE ECONOMIST, IT’S A SMALL WORLD: A SPECIAL REPORT ON
SMART SYSTEMS, Nov. 6, 2010, at 6, 6 (“The concept of the ‘internet of things’ dates
back to the late 1980s, when researchers at Palo Alto Research Centre (PARC) in
Silicon Valley imagined a future in which the virtual and the real world would be
connected.”).
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A. The Internet of Things
The conceptual vision of the Internet of Things promises a
world of interconnected smart devices constantly sharing
data.30  As Jeremy Rifkin has written,
The Internet of Things will connect every thing with everyone
in an integrated global network. People, machines, natural
resources, production lines, logistics networks, consumption
habits, recycling flows, and virtually every other aspect of
economic and social life will be linked via sensors and
software to the IoT platform, continually feeding Big Data to
every node—businesses, homes, vehicles—moment to mo-
ment, in real time.31
While such a world of “readable, recognizable, locatable, ad-
dressable, and controllable”32 objects remains in the future,
the capacity and interest in tracking everything from our foot-
steps to our energy usage has spurred exponential growth in
developing the “Internet of Everything.”33
30 Quentin Hardy, Technology, in Translation, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2014, at
F2 (“Internet of Things: The idea of an Internet on which millions of industrial and
personal objects are connected, usually through cloud systems.  The objects
would deliver sensor information, and possibly modify themselves, to create over-
all management of a larger system, like a factory or city.”); PAUL KOMINERS, INTER-
OPERABILITY CASE STUDY, INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT), The Berkman Center for Internet
& Society Research (April 2012), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications
(“The grand vision of the Internet of Things (IoT) is a world of networked intelligent
objects.  Every car, refrigerator, and carton of milk would be distinguished with its
RFID chip, and they communicate constantly and seamlessly to create a much
more efficient world.”).
31 JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY: THE INTERNET OF THINGS,
THE COLLABORATIVE COMMONS, AND THE ECLIPSE OF CAPITALISM 11 (2014); see also
DAVID ROSE, ENCHANTED OBJECTS: DESIGN, HUMAN DESIRE, AND THE INTERNET OF
THINGS 5–7 (2014) (describing the author’s fascination with real and fictional
objects “dedicated to a single task of information delivery”).
32 Melanie Swan, Sensor Mania! The Internet of Things, Wearable Computing,
Objective Metrics, and the Quantified Self 2.0, 1 J. Sensor & Actuator Networks
217, 217–18 (2012) (“The ‘Internet of Things’ is the general idea of things, espe-
cially everyday objects, that are readable, recognizable, locatable, addressable,
and controllable via the Internet—whether via RFID, wireless LAN, wide-area
network, or other means.” (quoting NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, DISRUPTIVE CIVIL
TECHNOLOGIES: SIX TECHNOLOGIES WITH POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON US INTERESTS OUT TO
2025 app. F-1 (2008))).
33 See DAVE EVANS, THE INTERNET OF EVERYTHING 1 (2012), https://www.cisco
.com/web/about/ac79/docs/innov/IoE.pdf; Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of
Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns With-
out Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 10 (2015) (“This so-called
Internet of Things—or machine-to-machine connectivity and communications—
promises to usher in ‘a third computing revolution’ and bring about profound
changes that will rival the first wave of Internet innovation.” (quoting Lee, supra
note 10 (footnotes omitted))); see generally Julie Brill, The Internet of Things: R
Building Trust and Maximizing Benefits Through Consumer Control, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 205, 211–12 (2014) (discussing the amount of health information available
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As new efficiencies have pushed down the cost of sensors
and new innovations have improved the communication capac-
ities of low-power devices, the growth of these smart devices
has dramatically expanded.34  Financial analysts report that
the Internet of Things will be a multi-trillion dollar industry
involving billions of smart devices.35  While these numbers mix
industrial use with consumer adoption, the promise of tiny,
precise, and continuous communicating sensors in localized
settings is very real.36
The backbone of the Internet of Things involves low-cost,
low-power sensors that relay information about smart objects
to collecting systems.  Early adoption centered on Radio-Fre-
quency Identification (RFID)37 tags which allowed objects to be
marked with unique identifiers and tracked in real time.38  De-
velopment of wireless (Wi-Fi) systems, Bluetooth, and Global
to data brokers); Rutledge et al., supra note 28 (arguing that the “Internet of
Things” is better conceptualized as an “Internet of Devices”).
34 Thierer, supra note 33, ¶ 12 (“IoT is sometimes understood as being synon-
ymous with ‘smart’ systems: smart homes, smart buildings, smart appliances,
smart health, smart mobility, smart cities, and so on.” (footnotes omitted)).
35 Gil Press, Internet of Things by the Numbers: Market Estimates and Fore-
casts, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2014, 1:17 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/
2014/08/22/internet-of-things-by-the-numbers-market-estimates-and-fore-
casts/ [https://perma.cc/T5PD-B9E4]; Swan, supra note 32, at 218 (“Cisco esti-
mates that by 2020 there will be 50 billion connected devices, 7 times the world’s
population.”).
36 Steve Lohr, For Industry, Digital Disruption, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2012, at
B1 (“For the last few years, G.E. and Mount Sinai Medical Center have been
working on a project to optimize the operations of the 1,100-bed hospital in New
York.  Hospitals, in a sense, are factories of health care. . . .  At Mount Sinai,
patients get a black plastic wristband with a location sensor and other informa-
tion.  Similar sensors are on beds and medical equipment.  An important advan-
tage . . . is to be able to see the daily flow of patients, physical assets and
treatment as it unfolds.”).
37 Kyle Sommer, Riding the Wave: The Uncertain Future of RFID Legislation,
35 J. LEGIS. 48, 49–51 (2009) (“The RFID tag consists of radio antenna attached to
a microchip.  These microchips have the capacity to store a variety of information,
including item-specific Electronic Product Code (EPC) identifiers, information
about the item itself including consumption status or product freshness, or per-
sonal identification such as a bank account or social security number.”); Kevin
Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2321, 2330 (2007) (“An
RFID chip contains a small amount of memory and a wireless antenna.  In the
presence of a nearby reader device, it functions as a remote bar code.  Unlike
conventional bar codes, RFID ‘tags’ need only be in the vicinity of a reader device,
not passed manually under a scanner, and they have substantially greater infor-
mation capacity.”).
38 Luigi Atzori et al., The Internet of Things: A Survey, 54 COMPUTER NETWORKS
2787, 2788–90 (2010) (“[RFID] [t]ags are characterized by a unique identifier and
are applied to objects (even persons or animals).  Readers trigger the tag transmis-
sion by generating an appropriate signal, which represents a query for the possi-
ble presence of tags in the surrounding area and for the reception of their IDs.
Accordingly, RFID systems can be used to monitor objects in real-time, without
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Positioning Systems (GPS) technologies has allowed for alter-
native tracking and communication mechanisms.39  Embedded
in physical objects and occasionally people, smart sensors
communicate particularized data—“movement, heat, pressure,
or location”—about the thing tagged.40  More sophisticated
smart devices such as smartphones essentially provide a clus-
ter of sensor and communications systems that utilize all of the
available technologies.41
In the consumer space,42 smart devices have added value
and marketing allure to ordinary products.  One can now buy a
smart watch,43 drive a smart car,44 live in a smart home,45 and
even drink from a smart cup that monitors the amount and
the need of being in line-of-sight; this allows for mapping the real world into the
virtual world.”).
39 Thierer, supra note 33, ¶ 11 (“[L]ow-power devices typically rely on sensor
technologies as well as existing wireless networking systems and protocols (Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth, near field communication, and GPS) . . . .”); Atzori et al., supra note 38,
at 2787 (“The basic idea of this concept is the pervasive presence around us of a
variety of things or objects—such as Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags,
sensors, actuators, mobile phones, etc.—which, through unique addressing
schemes, are able to interact with each other and cooperate with their neighbors
to reach common goals.”).
40 Peppet, supra note 5, at 98 (“Microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) sen-
sors translate physical phenomenon, such as movement, heat, pressure, or loca-
tion, into digital information.”); Jones, supra note 1, at 41–42 (“In the smart
public, things connect regardless of the time, place, path, network, or service. In
order for this to occur, physical objects must contain embedded technology to
sense and communicate.  As wireless protocols become more efficient and sensors
and processors become smaller and less expensive, anything can become
smart.”).
41 See, e.g., Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, FTC, Remarks at the
Consumer Electronics Show: Promoting an Internet of Inclusion: More Things
AND More People 2 (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/public_statements/promoting-internet-inclusion-more-things-more-peo-
ple/140107ces-iot.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NL4-6FAL] (“Mobile devices also play
an important role in the Internet of Things as they collect, analyze, and share
information about users and their environments, such as their current location,
travel patterns, speeds, and the noise levels in their surroundings.”).
42 For a history of the development of the Internet of Things, including the
consumer space, see Ferguson, supra note 20, at 812–18.
43 Christopher Mims, Almost Every Major Consumer Electronics Manufacturer
Is Now Working on a Smart Watch, QUARTZ (July 5, 2013), http://qz.com/101058/
smart-watch-explosion/ [https://perma.cc/U43W-YLG8].
44 Henderson, supra note 9, at 705 (describing Ford Motor Company’s boast R
of being able to track the driving habits of purchasers through data systems built
within the car).
45 Caleb Garling, Google Enters Homes with Purchase of Nest, S.F. CHRONICLE
(Jan. 14, 2014)  (“Palo Alto’s Nest is a flagship brand in the burgeoning Internet of
Things—a catchphrase for a wave of tech innovations that could turn once-mun-
dane appliances like ovens, thermostats, microwaves, fridges and garage-door
openers into a network of devices that communicate with each other.”); see also
NEST, https://nest.com/ [https://perma.cc/DWT2-UVRH] (displaying various
smart home technology options).
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type of liquids you drink.46  Wearable technology47 has revolu-
tionized professional sports,48 personal fitness training,49
health monitoring,50 and has even been incorporated into ma-
ternity clothing to track fetal health.51  A culture of self-moni-
toring products under the concept of “the Quantified Self”52
has encouraged cultural acceptance and spurred technological
innovation.53  Future products will include smart heart
46 Ellis Hamburger, Vessyl is the Smart Cup that Knows Exactly What You’re
Drinking, THE VERGE (June 12, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.theverge.com/
2014/6/12/5801106/vessyl-smart-cup-that-knows-exactly-what-youre-drink-
ing [https://perma.cc/5LBN-HPJQ].
47 Bill Wasik, Why Wearable Tech Will Be as Big as the Smartphone, WIRED
(Dec. 17, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2013/12/wearable-
computers [https://perma.cc/G4Q9-AJDU].
48 Shira Springer, Sports Wearables Are the Wave of the Future, BOS. GLOBE
(May 25, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2014/05/24/sports-
wearables-are-wave-future/4gwNDNBYxPCEkD4h9yYf8K/story.html [https://
perma.cc/D3C3-5PLH]; Kevin Seifert, Inside Slant: The Other Side of NFL Weara-
ble Technology, ESPN, (Mar. 2, 2015), http://espn.go.com/blog/nflnation/post/
_/id/162679/inside-slant-the-other-side-of-nfl-wearable-technology [https://per
ma.cc/GUT8-8QH5].
49 Ginia Bellafante, At the Gym, Abs and Stats, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/03/nyregion/orangetheory-workout-new-
years-resolution-fitness.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/SCD7-FLDF] (discussing
the rise of Orangetheory training, which incorporates wearable devices to record
and display fitness progress in real time).
50 Jones, supra note 1, at 643 (“Smart socks, made by Heapsylon are infused
with textile pressure sensors paired with a set of proprietary electronics that not
only accurately track steps, speed, calories, altitude gain, environmental temper-
ature, and distance, but also track cadence, foot landing technique, center of
balance, and weight distribution on the foot to help prevent foot injuries for the
large niche market of twenty-five million American runners.”); Thierer, supra note
33, ¶ 22  (“As they grow more sophisticated, wearable health devices will help
users track, and even diagnose various conditions, and potentially advise a
course of action or, more simply, remind users to take medications or contact
medical professionals as necessary.  In the process, these health and fitness
devices and applications could eventually become ‘lifestyle remotes’ that help
consumers control or automate many other systems around them, regardless of
whether they are in their homes, offices, cars, or the like.” (footnotes omitted));
Parmy Olson, Wearable Tech Is Plugging into Health Insurance, FORBES (June 19,
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/06/19/wearable-tech-
health-insurance [https://perma.cc/LGM9-DNNH].
51 Olivia Lutwak, Student Creates Smart Maternity Wear, CORNELL DAILY SUN,
Jan. 25, 2015, at 1.
52 See generally Swan, supra note 32.
53 See, e.g., Woven Electronics: An Uncommon Thread, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 8,
2014), http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21598328-con-
ductive-fibres-lighter-aircraft-electric-knickers-flexible-filaments [https://perma
.cc/DRY8-GFTM] (“Developments in the use of conductive fibres mean fabric itself
can now become an electronic device, allowing wearables to be incorporated into
the most stylish clothing.”); Finch & Tene, supra note 10, 1600 (“Bioaware and R
wearable devices—already available from t-shirts to smart watches, fitness bands
to game consoles—track and interpret even more specific and sensitive human
data, such as an individual’s heartbeats, eye movements, and gait.”).
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monitors,54 smart bandages,55 and other biological implants.56
Powerful technology companies such as Apple,57 Google,58 and
Microsoft59 are investing in the Internet of Things, not simply to
sell products, but to collect the even more valuable data that
comes from monitoring those products.60
Data—the digital trails of a tracked life—has become a val-
uable commodity.  As Professor Scott Peppet has written, “Sen-
sor data capture incredibly rich nuance about who we are, how
we behave, what our tastes are, and even our intentions.  Once
filtered through ‘Big Data’ analytics, these data are the grist for
drawing revealing and often unexpected inferences about our
habits, predilections, and personalities.”61  For companies in-
terested in selling products to us, this targeted insight might
provide a creepy62 but relatively benign competitive advantage,
but when government and law enforcement have access to
54 Thierer, supra note 33, ¶ 32 (“CardioMEMS HF System uses a wireless
sensor, implanted in the pulmonary artery, to transmit health information to an
external device, and ‘then [it] forwards the data to the patient’s medical team.’”
(quoting Maria K. Rega, Implantable Med Devices: 3 Smart Technologies to Watch,
PTC (June 2, 2014), http://blogs.ptc.com/2014/06/02/implantable-med-de-
vices-3-smart-technologies-to-watch/)).
55 Springer, supra note 48 (describing the Biostamp patch).
56 Keiron Monks, Forget Wearable Tech, Embeddable Implants Are Already
Here, CNN (Apr. 9, 2014, 1:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/08/tech/
forget-wearable-tech-embeddable-implants/ [https://perma.cc/PM4C-PGT7].
57 Erin Mershon, Apple Dives into “Internet of Things,” POLITICO (June 2, 2014,
6:01 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/apple-wwdc-2014-internet-
of-things-107336.html#ixzz33hMxZTIN [https://perma.cc/867A-5T6J].
58 Ben Gilbert, Google Fit Is Android’s Answer to Exercise and Health Track-
ing, ENGADGET (June 25, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2014/06/
25/google-fit [https://perma.cc/G2VQ-FKRN]; Hayley Tsukayama, Google Devel-
ops Android for Wearables You May Actually Want to Wear, WASH. POST (Mar. 18,
2014, 11:13 AM), http:// www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/
2014/03/18/google-develops-android-for-wearables-you-may-actually-want-to-
wear [https://perma.cc/K3R5-G8QJ].
59 Daniel B. Kline, How Microsoft Will Incorporate the Internet of Things into
Windows 8.1, MOTLEY FOOL (May 20, 2014, 11:13 AM), http:// www.fool.com/
investing/general/2014/05/20/how-microsoft-will-incorporate-the-internet-of-
thi.aspx [https://perma.cc/ES39-Z8R9].
60 Wasik, supra note 47.
61 Peppet, supra note 5, at 90; see also Steve Johnson, Internet of Things Will
Transform Life, but Experts Fear for Privacy and Personal Data, MERCURY NEWS
(Nov. 1, 2014), www.mercurynews.com/2014/11/01/internet-of-things-will-
transform-life-but-experts-fear-for-privacy-and-personal-data/ (“Even when de-
signed for limited functions, experts say, many of these Web-linked gadgets will
record whatever they see and hear in homes, which could provide detailed dos-
siers on the people living there, especially when combined with what’s amassed by
other interconnected machines.  The personal data revealed could include every-
thing from your friends, hobbies and daily routines to your political views, relig-
ious affiliation and even your sexual activities.”).
62 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy
and Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 66–69 (2013).
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these data trails, this widening collection of sensors creates
significant surveillance concerns.
B. “Sensorveillance”
This Article focuses on what I term “sensorveillance”—here
defined as the growth of sensor surveillance to collect and track
data among the Internet of Things.63  The flip side of wonder-
fully revealing data trails for consumer insights is that those
same digital fingerprints can also be used for government in-
vestigation.64  Police entrusted to prevent crime have recog-
nized the value of digital surveillance.65  As the Internet of
Things grows, the data trails from these smart devices will
become increasingly helpful to law enforcement.66
The reasons for this law enforcement interest are simple
and non-technological.  Most violent and property crime in-
volves a physical location and a particular time.67  Geoloca-
tional targeting technology can identify suspects near the crime
63 The growth of sensor surveillance involves technologies beyond smart de-
vices.  As I have written about previously, sophisticated technologies now allow
law enforcement to track human movements through facial recognition technol-
ogy, license plates through automated license plate readers, and old-fashioned
video surveillance.  The capabilities to track in real-time and over larger areas of a
city have been improved by more integrated systems and over-flight capacities.
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment Security in Pub-
lic, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1283, 1293 (2014); see also Richards, supra note 6, at R
1936 (“The scope and variety of the types of surveillance that are possible today
are unprecedented in human history.  This fact alone should give us pause.”);
Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1349, 1377 (2004) (describing Orwellian surveillance); Christopher Slobogin,
Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity,
72 MISS. L.J. 213, 214–15 (2002) (“The advent of sophisticated technology that
allows the government to watch, zoom in on, track, and record the activities of
anyone, anywhere in public, twenty-four hours a day, demands regulation.”).
64 Finch & Tene, supra note 10, at 1601 (“The normalizing of constant data R
collection and bioaware sensors invites private companies literally under our
skin; it also opens the door to new forms of government surveillance.”).
65 John Markoff, You’re Leaving a Digital Trail. What About Privacy?, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2008, at BU1, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/business/
30privacy.html [https://perma.cc/NZX4-PTRZ].
66 Thierer, supra note 33, at ¶ 160 (“The use of wearable technologies by law
enforcement officials—or law enforcement’s ability to tap into private data flow
from wearable devices—deserves special scrutiny and additional legal protections
for the public.”).
67 This insight was discovered decades ago by the first environmental crimi-
nologists. DEREK J. PAULSEN & MATTHEW B. ROBINSON, CRIME MAPPING AND SPATIAL
ASPECTS OF CRIME 154 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the history and role of environ-
mental criminologists); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and
the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing “High-Crime Areas”, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 186
(2011) (same).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN304.txt unknown Seq: 15 28-MAR-17 9:53
2017] THE “SMART” FOURTH AMENDMENT 561
scene or undermine an alibi defense.68  Place and time can be
recorded with certainty.  Suspects can be virtually tracked.
Smartphones with tracking capabilities already have been used
to prove links to criminal activities.69  Stingray devices (IMSM
catchers) designed to intercept cell phone communications and
track locations have been used to identify suspects.70  As more
sensors become embedded with identifiable information, more
opportunities will exist to prove geographic and temporal con-
nections to the crime.
Sensors can also reveal information that inferentially
might help law enforcement investigate crime.  For example,
high energy consumption from smart home sensors can reveal
marijuana cultivation.71  Excessive refills from a smart pill bot-
tle of pain killers might suggest substance abuse.  Smart cars
record speed and distance, and will literally call the police on
you when you leave the scene of a hit and run.72  Finally, wear-
able fitness sensors provide health data that is granular
enough to suggest the use of illegal substances or the type of
physical exertion consistent with violent acts.73  In a case in-
volving drug use, an elevated heartbeat could be used as evi-
dence to prove the time when drugs were ingested.74  In a case
involving an arson suspect, the extent of healing for a burn
wound could reveal the time of the arson.75
68 Derek McAuley, Century-Old Snooping, SLATE (Aug. 7, 2014, 7:57 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/08/what_wwi_
code_breakers_and_hedy_vlamarr_have_to_do_with_the_internet_of_things.html
[https://perma.cc/KAP7-ATUT] (“[W]ith many modern smartphone apps using
push technology to continually synchronize with their servers in the cloud, and
the phones in regular communication via your home Wi-Fi network when they are
in range, detecting when a smartphone has left the building is a trivial matter.”).
69 Heath Hardman, The Brave New World of Cell-Site Simulators, 8 ALB. GOV’T
L. REV. 1, 8–10 (2015) (describing use in criminal context); Brad Heath, Police
Secretly Track Cellphones to Solve Routine Crimes, USA TODAY (Aug. 24, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/baltimore-police-stingray-
cell-surveillance/31994181/ [https://perma.cc/B7UL-PKMT].
70 Heath, supra note 69.
71 Jack I. Lerner & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Taking the “Long View” on the Fourth
Amendment: Stored Records and the Sanctity of the Home, 2008 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 3, 6 (2008).
72 Alex Hern, Florida Woman Arrested for Hit-and-Run After Her Car Calls
Police, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2015/dec/07/florida-woman-arrested-hit-and-run-car-calls-police [https://per
ma.cc/MH8U-LF7Z].
73 See Peppet, supra note 5, at 101–02.
74 See Ferguson, supra note 20, at 820 (describing how an elevated heartbeat
can be detected through health monitors).
75 James Gerber, Flexible Smart Sensors and the Future of Health, ENGADGET
(Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/09/21/flexible-smart-sen-
sors-and-the-future-of-health/ [https://perma.cc/QMX3-YQRB].
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Sensor patterns, although not incriminating in themselves,
might lead police to develop suspicion.76  Location sensors
might suggest a pattern of proximity to a series of burglaries or
sexual assaults.  Electronic bank transfers might trigger suspi-
cion of money laundering.  Gunshots detected by an acoustic
sensor can reveal the presence of an illegal weapon.77  The list
goes on and will only become longer as many of our ordinary
activities become mediated through data communications and
linked to other digital information sources.78
Part II of this Article looks at the legal and constitutional
gaps concerning this data, but this section examines the tech-
nological vulnerabilities of this new sensor-based world.  The
focus here is on the direct interception of data trails by police,
not indirect access through third parties.  Because most data
trails arising from the Internet of Things can also be obtained
via the third party provider (usually the private company col-
lecting the data), this focus is necessarily limited.79  However,
as has been seen with GPS tracking, Stingrays, and other Wi-Fi
76 Peppet, supra note 5, at 120 (“The technical problem created by the In-
ternet of Things is that sensor data tend to combine in unexpected ways, giving
rise to powerful inferences from seemingly innocuous data sources.  Put simply,
in a world of connected sensors, ‘everything may reveal everything.’  Sensor data
are so rich, accurate, and fine-grained that data from any given sensor context
may be valuable in a variety of—and perhaps all—other economic or information
contexts.”).
77 Andras Petho et al., ShotSpotter Detection System Documents 39,000 Shoot-
ing Incidents in the District, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2013), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/investigations/shotspotter-detection-system-documents-39000-
shooting-incidents-in-the-district/2013/11/02/055f8e9c-2ab1-11e3-8ade-
a1f23cda135e_story.html [https://perma.cc/JUL2-89DW].
78 A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution:
Learning from Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713,
1726–27 (2015) (“In the very near future, data collected from real-world sensors
will routinely be linked to personal information available online.  Real-time photos
can rapidly be linked to online data.”).
79 See generally Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amend-
ment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34
PEPP. L. REV. 975, 1015 (2007) (“In the case of a third-party victim, the victim’s
independent interest in transferring the relevant information to law enforcement
outweighs the disclosing party’s privacy interest.”); Stephen E. Henderson, Learn-
ing from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Ana-
logs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L.
REV. 373, 395 (2006) (providing a 50-state overview of Third-Party Doctrine); Orin
S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 563–64
(2009) (“The ‘third-party doctrine’ is the Fourth Amendment rule that governs
collection of evidence from third parties in criminal investigations.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN304.txt unknown Seq: 17 28-MAR-17 9:53
2017] THE “SMART” FOURTH AMENDMENT 563
sniffing cases, these types of direct police interceptions do oc-
cur and need to be explored.80
Paralleling the scope of technology, the scope of security of
the Internet of Things ranges from the simplistic to the sophis-
ticated.  Due to its low cost and limited power and memory,
RFID surveillance has been recognized as quite vulnerable to
interception.81  Robust security measures have not been a pri-
ority.82  The lack of security largely has been seen as the cost of
ubiquitous connectivity.  Even so, the result is that these sen-
sors can be tracked at a distance and without the suspect
knowing that they are being so tracked.83
Even more sophisticated systems within the Internet of
Things reveal concerns with security.84  Wi-Fi systems have
80 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (involving usage of GPS
data as evidence); Heath, supra note 69 (describing the Stingray); Wagenseil, infra
note 85 (describing devices that use Wi-Fi).
81 Nicole A. Ozer, Rights “Chipped” Away: RFID and Identification Documents,
2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2008) (discussing the security risks of RFID
technology); Sommer, supra note 37, at 57 (“Privacy experts have identified three
technical aspects of RIFD [sic] tags that generate privacy concerns: they are pro-
miscuous since they will talk to any compatible reader; they are remotely readable
since they can read at a distance through obtuse materials like cardboard, cloth,
and plastic; and they are stealthy in that the tags are not only inconspicuous, but
an individual remains unaware when and to whom the tags are transmitting
information or when an unwanted third party is receipting tag information.”).
82 Scott J. Shackelford et al., When Toasters Attack: A Polycentric Approach to
Enhancing the ‘Security of Things’ 14, 16 (Kelley Sch. of Bus. Res. Paper, Paper
No. 16–6), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715799
[https://perma.cc/Y8ZN-RJ6N]; Tom Brewster, There are Real and Present Dan-
gers Around the Internet of Things, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2014, 9:00 AM), http:/
/www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/20/internet-of-things-security-
dangers [https://perma.cc/7ZVH-W9LT]; Nicole Perloth, Smart City Technology
May Be Vulnerable to Hackers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://
bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/21/smart-city-technology-may-be-vulnerable-
to-hackers/ [https://perma.cc/3QWE-QNQR].
83 Sommer, supra note 37, at 50 (“Unlike other Auto-IDs such as bar codes,
RFID is a relatively small, fast, technology ‘that enables tracking and monitoring
activities to be carried out using invisible radio waves over distances that range
from less than a centimet[er] to many hundreds of met[er]s.’”) (quoting ALAN BUT-
TERS, RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION: AN INTRODUCTION FOR LIBRARY PROFESSIONALS 2
(2006), http://www.sybis.com.au/sybis/RFID%20Whitepaper.pdf.).
84 Kashmir Hill, The Half-Baked Security of Our ‘Internet of Things,’ FORBES
(May 27, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/05/
27/article-may-scare-you-away-from-internet-of-things [https://perma.cc/
XG6D-4MJX]; John Brandon, Wearable Devices Pose Threats to Privacy and Se-
curity, FOX NEWS (June 18, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2014/06/18/
wearable-devices-pose-threats-to-privacy-and-security [https://perma.cc/
W4RJ-E363]; Home, Hacked Home: The Perils of Connected Devices, THE ECONO-
MIST (July 12, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/216064
20-perils-connected-devices-home-hacked-home [https://perma.cc/A3Y6-2L
RE].
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been intercepted with relative ease.85  Bluetooth technologies
have shown hacking vulnerabilities.86  Cell phones, while pro-
tective of communication content, have had their location data
revealed by Stingray devices.87  Wearables have been subject to
snooping.88  Home sensors have revealed lifestyle and appli-
ance use information.89  Even smart cars have been taken over
by hackers wishing to demonstrate security concerns.90
85 Paul Wagenseil, Google Spy Case Shows Why You Should Encrypt Your Wi-
Fi, NBC NEWS (May 1, 2012, 9:19 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/
technolog/google-spy-case-shows-why-you-need-encrypt-your-wi-744411
[https://perma.cc/R4F4-9JNB] (“Hackers snooping on unprotected or poorly pro-
tected Wi-Fi networks have been responsible for some of the biggest cyberheists in
recent history, including numerous thefts from Seattle-area businesses from
2006 to 2011 and the 2007 TJX Companies data breach, which exposed 45
million credit-card numbers.”).
86 Paul Ohm, The Olmsteadian Seizure Clause: The Fourth Amendment and
the Seizure of Intangible Property, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 44 (2008) (“Like
WiFi, Bluetooth security has been criticized and attacked, and there have been
reports of so-called Bluetooth sniffing, techniques which the police could use to
download a target’s address book or calendar from half-a-block away.”) (citing
Annalee Newitz, They’ve Got Your Number . . . , WIRED (Dec. 2004), http://www
.wired.com/wired/archive/12.12/phreakers_pr.html (describing Bluetooth at-
tacks on cellphones)).
87 Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret
Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone Surveillance and
Its Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11
(2014).
88 BitDefender Finds Phone to Smart Watch Communications Easy to Snoop,
THE SECURITY LEDGER, https://securityledger.com/2014/12/bitdefender-finds-
phone-to-smart-watch-communications-easy-to-snoop/#.VIsbz3uaWDk [https:/
/perma.cc/A2TJ-U55L] (“Researchers from the security firm BitDefender have
found that it is possible to snoop on wireless communications sent between smart
watches and Android devices to which they are paired.”); Peppet, supra note 5, at
134 (“A team from Florida International University showed that the Fitbit fitness
tracker could be vulnerable to a variety of security attacks, and that simple tools
could capture data from any Fitbit within 15 feet.”) (citing Mahmudur Rahman et
al., Fit and Vulnerable: Attacks and Defenses for a Health Monitoring Device, 1
(Apr. 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://arxiv.org/abs/1304.5672 [
http://perma.cc/8W4D-6DBA]).
89 2 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER-
SECURITY 25 (2014), http:// nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2014/NIST.IR.7628r1
.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG45-VEAH] (demonstrating how smart meter data
reveals lifestyle and appliance use information); Jordan Robertson, Your Outlet
Knows: How Smart Meters Reveal Behavior at Home, What We Watch on TV,
BLOOMBERG (June 11, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-10/
your-outlet-knows-how-smart-meters-can-reveal-behavior-at-home-what-we-
watch-on-tv.html [https://perma.cc/C4HH-QJRD].
90 See Larry Greenemeier, Fact or Fiction?: Your Car Is Hackable, SCI. AM.
(Apr. 2, 2014) http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/fact-or-fiction-your-
car-is-hackable1 [https://perma.cc/69CW-V7DR]; Keith Barry, Can Your Car Be
Hacked?, CAR & DRIVER (July 2011), http://www.caranddriver.com/features/
can-your-car-be-hacked-feature [https://perma.cc/9VN6-L459]; cf. Adam
Thierer & Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and Driv-
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While smartphone companies have responded with in-
creased encryption,91 and a movement has grown to combat
concerns about government surveillance,92 the Internet of
Things remains relatively unprotected.93  These current secur-
ity concerns become exacerbated when one considers problems
of interconnectivity and obsolescence.94  First, part of the value
of smart devices is being able to use other sources of informa-
tion to improve efficiency and convenience.  Perhaps your home
heating system is dependent on the weather forecast, which
means the device is also dependent on the security of the
weather forecasting service.  Any weak link in any data pro-
vider can compromise the security of the entire system.95  Or
perhaps your system is completely secure now, but in five years
(a lifetime for digital devices) the system needs an upgrade and
the security upgrade is not compatible with the old system.
Robust security requires regular updating (patching of security
holes), and most smart devices do not have that capability, not
to mention that most consumers do not have the interest in
constantly purchasing new smart devices to keep up with se-
curity vulnerabilities.96  Unlike a smartphone, which you might
regularly exchange every few years, you will not be purchasing
a new smart refrigerator at the same pace.
Smart devices and the data communicated by them pro-
vide a new frontier in the world of surveillance.97  Technological
fixes and hacks will continue apace.  Government agents will
erless Cars, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 339, 376 (2015) (noting that it may
already be possible to hack cars that have automatic cruise control).
91 Craig Timberg & Greg Miller, FBI Blasts Apple, Google for Locking Police Out
of Phones, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/busi-
ness/technology/2014/09/25/68c4e08e-4344-11e4-9a15-137aa0153527_story
.html [https://perma.cc/Z2AK-GBCP].
92 See generally Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance Evasion and
Fourth Amendment Suspicion, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 997, 999–1002 (2013) (discussing
various ways people have protested government surveillance).
93 FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN A CON-
NECTED WORLD (2015), http:// www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/fed-
eral-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-
things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK57-ULNL].
94 See The Internet of Unpatched Things, presentation by Sarthak Grover and
Nick Feamster at the FTC PrivacyCon Conference (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www
.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/10/00071-98118.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3T96-FAHK] (detailing the risks associated with “unpatched”
internet devices).
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 Don’t Panic: Making Progress on the Going Dark Debate, THE BERKMAN
CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY (Feb. 1, 2016), https://cyber
.law.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Go
ing_Dark_Debate.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP7S-K7SW] (“The audio and video sen-
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see the value of these advancements for crime suppression and
investigation.  The question will be how the law adapts to this
changing field.  The constitutional question is the subject of
Part II.
II
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND DATA TRAILS
This section examines how the Fourth Amendment might
address the surveillance of smart objects.  Data and data trails
obviously were not considered by the drafters of the Fourth
Amendment.98  Yet, the Fourth Amendment’s protection has
expanded beyond the pre-electronic, pre-digital world of the
Founding.99  The Supreme Court has regularly addressed tech-
nological innovations, expanding the definitions and protec-
tions of Fourth Amendment rights in the face of inventions
such as automobiles, telephones, and tracking devices.100
Fourth Amendment doctrine is anything but clear, as con-
flicting theories of constitutional interpretation and ever-
widening exceptions have resulted in a confused patchwork of
protections.101  Unraveling the various doctrinal threads
reveals a knotty, tangled, but growing web of Fourth Amend-
ment rules and principles, none of which obviously apply to
data trails.  Yet, examining the question of data trails does
reveal a unifying principle that suggests a way forward.  Under-
lying the protection of most persons, homes, papers, effects,
and expectations of privacy is a concern for personal informa-
tion—information that allows for self-expression, autonomy,
association, religion, liberty, family, and security.102  As will be
sors on IoT devices will open up numerous avenues for government actors to
demand access to real-time and recorded communications.”).
98 The Fourth Amendment was ratified in 1791 before the advent of electricity
or computers.  One of the earliest articulations of the world of smart devices can
be found two hundred years later in 1991, in Mark Weiser’s Scientific American
article “The Computer for the 21st Century.” See Mark Weiser, The Computer for
the 21st Century, SCI. AM. (Sept. 1991), https://www.ics.uci.edu/~corps/phase
ii/Weiser-Computer21stCentury-SciAm.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RTF-WFWT].
99 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014) (smartphones);
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–37 (2001) (thermal imagers); United States
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) (beepers); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
351–52 (1967) (telephones).
100 Orin S. Kerr, Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 403, 405 (2013); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of
the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011).
101 See Ferguson, supra note 63, at 1293 (describing the Fourth Amendment
as a “doctrinal muddle”).
102 This insight has been previously recognized by privacy law scholars and
criminal justice scholars. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amend-
ment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 583 (1990) (“If the fourth
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discussed, the study of data trails brings into stark relief the
Fourth Amendment’s long-standing concern for informational
security.103
The first part of this section briefly summarizes the existing
state of Fourth Amendment doctrine, highlighting suggestions
from recent cases about how digital information might be cov-
ered.  The second part explores how the Fourth Amendment
maps onto the puzzle of data trails, revealing a significant gap
in constitutional protections.
A. Existing Fourth Amendment Framework
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.104  Arising from the Founders’ concern
with arbitrary government surveillance,105 the Fourth Amend-
ment establishes constitutional limits on police power.106  Like
amendment was intended to promote a sense of personal security, it must extend
to the protection of informational privacy.”); William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem
and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1021 (1995)
(“[I]nformational privacy—privacy as nondisclosure—is and has been preemi-
nent. . . .  The question, in other words, is whether what the police did was likely
to capture something secret.” (emphasis omitted)); Tomkovicz, supra note 22, at
665–66 (“Recognition of the fundamentally information-acquisitive nature of con-
stitutional searches leads logically toward a conception of the fourth amend-
ment’s ward as primarily informational privacy—that is, an interest in
maintaining confidentiality or secrecy, in not having data about one’s life learned
by the government.”); but see Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy’s
Problem, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1079, 1086 (1995) (arguing that modern Fourth Amend-
ment law is not about privacy, but limiting the “collateral damage” from searches
and seizures); Louis Michael Seidman, Making the Best of Fourth Amendment
Law: A Comment on The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1296, 1301 (1999) (“The Fourth Amendment is not solely about
informational privacy. It also speaks to humiliation, inconvenience, embarrass-
ment, and violence.”).
103 As will be discussed in Part III, informational security is distinguished from
privacy.  While certain definitions of privacy might perfectly overlap with a concept
of intentionally excluding others from one’s personal sphere of influence, see ALAN
F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967), the Supreme Court’s conception of
privacy—influenced by the false friend doctrine, the third party doctrine, and the
Katz progeny does not so overlap.  Thus, as a constitutional matter there exists a
need to redefine this secure informational space.
104 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
105 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (explaining
that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect against “arbitrary and
oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal
security of individuals” (citations omitted)); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476
U.S. 227, 240 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The Fourth Amendment protects
private citizens from arbitrary surveillance by their Government.”).
106 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (“Our cases have recog-
nized that the Fourth Amendment was the founding generation’s response to the
reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which al-
lowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for
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many provisions in the United States Constitution, the mean-
ing of those limits has been regularly debated in scholarly com-
mentary.107  Many engaging histories of the Fourth
Amendment exist,108 and many more theories about how to
understand the doctrine have been generated.109  For purposes
of this Article, a brief overview suffices to set the stage for later
analysis.
For the Fourth Amendment to apply, government agents
must conduct a “search” or “seizure.”110  Searches and seizures
are terms of art in the Fourth Amendment and have been de-
fined variously in different eras.111  After a quiet beginning with
essentially no major Fourth Amendment cases for 100
years,112 the Supreme Court decided Boyd v. United States,113
a case involving a court order demanding that a commercial
glass company produce private business papers.114  Relying on
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Court held that such a
evidence of criminal activity.  Opposition to such searches was in fact one of the
driving forces behind the Revolution itself.”).
107 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757, 757–61 (1994) (referring to modern Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence as “an embarrassment” and a “mess”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspec-
tives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353–54 (1974) (identifying
and discussing a number of issues that complicate the development of a single
Fourth Amendment theory); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 556 (1999) (arguing that search and seizure
doctrine has evolved and provided officers with “far more discretionary authority
than the Framers ever intended or expected”); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts
About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 823 (1994) (disagreeing with schol-
ars who look to the intent or expectations of the Framers to shape Fourth Amend-
ment law).
108 E.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES (1997); THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION (2008); WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND
ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791 (2009) (publishing William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth
Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning (1990); ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECON-
STRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789–1868
(2006).
109 E.g., Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Prop-
erty, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 308 (1998); Davies, supra
note 107, at 550; Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era:
Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 562
(1996); Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical
Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 960–65 (1997); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth
Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1741 (2000); Daniel J.
Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511 (2010); Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393,
415 (1995).
110 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
111 See infra Part II.
112 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
113 Id.
114 The business was E.A. Boyd and Sons. See id. at 616–19.
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demand violated the Constitution.115  The Court focused on the
informational harm in being compelled to reveal private infor-
mation through governmental coercion:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very es-
sence of constitutional liberty and security.  They reach far-
ther than the concrete form of the case then before the court,
with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all inva-
sions on the part of the government and its employ[ee]s of the
sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.  It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the inva-
sion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property, where that right has never been
forfeited by his conviction of some public offence . . . .116
Three points about Boyd are notable for an article focused
on informational security.  First, in referencing “the privacies of
life” the Court appeared to focus on harm independent of the
physical invasion of “breaking of his doors” or “rummaging of
his drawers.”117  At issue in Boyd was a formal court order
requesting papers through a court process.  The harm involved
revealing information, not forceful, physical searching or seiz-
ing.  Second, the focus was obviously on the information in the
papers, not the physical parchment itself.  “Papers” has been
the proxy term for protecting the contents in the papers, not
merely the existence of the papers.  Third, the context of the
case—involving business records, as opposed to, for example, a
personal diary, suggests that the reach of these privacies of life
goes beyond revealing personal information and covers pri-
vately held, but not overtly intimate, information.118
As students of the Fourth Amendment know, this broad
protection in Boyd was soon replaced with a more limited,
physically-oriented, property-based understanding of a search
focused on the textual language of “persons, houses, papers,
and effects.”119  From Boyd to the 1960s, the Supreme Court
115 Id. at 622 (“It is our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a
man’s private papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his
property, is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in all
cases in which a search and seizure would be; because it is a material ingredient,
and effects the sole object and purpose of search and seizure.”).
116 Id. at 630.
117 Id.
118 Boyd had a brief Fourth Amendment impact, in part because it was seen as
more of a Fifth Amendment case. See Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and
Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 814 (2005).
119 Jack Wade Nowlin, The Warren Court’s House Built on Sand: From Security
in Persons, Houses, Papers, and Effects to Mere Reasonableness in Fourth Amend-
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN304.txt unknown Seq: 24 28-MAR-17 9:53
570 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:547
generally looked to see if persons, papers, homes, or effects
were physically invaded, triggering the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.120  This so-called trespass doctrine121 created
some anomalous rulings, so, for example, a microphone placed
on a wall to eavesdrop on an adjoining room would not be
considered a search because no physical intrusion of a pro-
tected space occurred,122 but a “spike mike” that barely pierced
the adjoining wall to capture the same conversation would have
been a search (because of the minimal trespassory intru-
sion).123  Such reasoning was criticized as being too limiting
and ignoring the technological developments that could soon
invade privacy without physically intruding on constitutionally
protected spaces.124
In response, the Supreme Court began to develop the now
familiar “reasonable expectation of privacy” theory in Katz v.
United States.125  Justice Harlan established the new test in a
concurrence, asking whether an individual has a subjective
expectation of privacy that society deems objectively reasona-
ble.126  In Katz, the issue was whether the conversation of
ment Doctrine, 81 MISS. L.J. 1017, 1031–32 (2012) (“This traditional [protected
interest] approach emphasized the interests specifically enumerated as protected
in the text of the Fourth Amendment, ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ and
the common-law principles rooted in property law that formed the important
broader legal context of the text.” (citations omitted)). But see Orin Kerr, The
Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 68 (2012)
(arguing that the Court did not use a specific formulation to identify what counted
as a Fourth Amendment search).
120 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“[W]ell into the 20th century,
our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.” (cita-
tions omitted)); Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth
Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance,
86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1397–98 (2002) (“Until the 1960s, the Fourth Amendment
protected against government trespass in any of the four areas named in the
Fourth Amendment—houses, persons, papers, and effects.  Under that approach,
the prevalence of technology the police used was irrelevant.  The sole inquiry was
whether operation of the technology required intrusion into a protected area.  If
so, a search occurred; if not, then the Fourth Amendment was not implicated.”
(citations omitted)).
121 Kerr, supra note 119 (arguing that the so-called trespass doctrine did not
in fact control early Fourth Amendment cases).
122 See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942).
123 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509–12 (1961).
124 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
125 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Timothy Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the Right to Be Secure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 977, 996 (2008) (“Katz signified a shift away from the property-trespass
theory of Fourth Amendment analysis by finding a constitutionally protected in-
terest separate from any place and distinct from tangible property.”).
126 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the
rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement,
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Charlie Katz with his gambling associates picked up by a
microphone taped to a public telephone booth was a search.127
No physical invasion of the phone booth occurred, but the
Court majority reframed the issue by explaining that the
Fourth Amendment protected “people, not places.”128  Justice
Harlan’s concurrence completed this reframing with its reason-
ing that, by shutting the door and paying his “toll” to use the
payphone, Katz could claim a “reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy” in the content of his call.129
Since Katz, the reasonable expectation of privacy test has
controlled the threshold analysis of whether a Fourth Amend-
ment search has occurred.  The test, however, has also created
some counter-intuitive results.  For example, the Supreme
Court has held that use of a low-flying plane to look into a
suspect’s backyard is not a “search” because such an action
did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.130  Clearly,
police were “searching” in the ordinary sense of the term, look-
ing for incriminating information, but it was not a Fourth
Amendment search because no expectation of privacy had been
violated.131  Significant scholarly effort has been expended to
define whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an
object, or area, or thing.132  Despite criticism and debate, the
reasonable expectation of privacy test has since been cited tens
of thousands of times and rather singularly controlled Fourth
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”).
127 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitu-
tional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 820 (2004).
128 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (majority opinion); id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
129 Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The critical fact in this case is that
‘(o)ne who occupies it, (a telephone booth) shuts the door behind him, and pays
the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume’ that his
conversation is not being intercepted.” (quoting id. at 352 (majority opinion))).
130 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1986).
131 See id.
132 E.g., Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1241
(2012); Katz, supra note 102, at 505–07; Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the
Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 314, 315–20 (2012); Orin S. Kerr, Four
Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 505–07 (2007); Paul
Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309,
1334–36 (2012); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Ex-
pectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical
Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727
(1993); Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 857–58 (2002); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment
in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (2002).
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Amendment search questions up until 2012 and Justice
Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in Jones v. United States.133
Pre-Jones, conventional wisdom held that the trespass the-
ory of the Fourth Amendment had been relegated to history,
essentially overruled by Katz.134  However, in a case that in-
volved the warrantless Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) track-
ing of a suspect’s car for twenty-eight days, Justice Scalia re-
claimed the trespass theory as a viable Fourth Amendment
alternative.135  Justice Scalia explained that by “physically oc-
cupy[ing] private property for the purpose of obtaining informa-
tion” (placing the GPS on the car), the police conducted a
search.136  The private property was Jones’ wife’s car (an ef-
fect), and the placement of the GPS device with the intent to
obtain personal information from the device constituted a
search.137  Justice Scalia reiterated the importance of the term
“effect” and its close association with the protection of private
property.138  While conceding the continued viability of the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy theory, Scalia offered an 18th
Century solution for a 21th Century problem.139
Of note, five Justices concurred in Jones, but on different
grounds.  The concurring Justices found that twenty-eight
days of warrantless GPS surveillance for a narcotics investiga-
tion should be considered a Fourth Amendment search be-
cause it violated a reasonable expectation of privacy.140
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who joined the majority opinion but
wrote separately, first agreed with Justice Scalia that “[t]he
Government usurped Jones’ property for the purpose of con-
ducting surveillance on him, thereby invading privacy interests
long afforded, and undoubtedly entitled to, Fourth Amendment
133 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 947 (2012).
134 As mentioned supra, some scholars have since pointed out that there may
never have been an actual trespass theory. See Kerr, supra note 119 and explan-
atory parenthetical at supra note 121.
135 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–52.
136 Id. at 949.
137 See id.
138 Id. (“The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection to
property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to ‘the right of the people
to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures’; the phrase ‘in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects’ would have been superfluous.”).
139 Id. at 953 (“Unlike the concurrence, which would make Katz the exclusive
test, we do not make trespass the exclusive test.  Situations involving merely the
transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz
analysis.”); see id. at 957–58 (Alito, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority’s reli-
ance on 18th Century tort principles).
140 See id. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
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protection.”141  But, Justice Sotomayor went on to note that a
broader protection may also be needed when facing advanced
surveillance techniques, “[w]ith increasing regularity, the Gov-
ernment will be capable of duplicating the monitoring under-
taken in this case by enlisting factory- or owner-installed
vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”142  To
combat these technological threats to privacy and security,
Justice Sotomayor reframed the Fourth Amendment question,
stating: “I would ask whether people reasonably expect that
their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner
that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will,
their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so
on.”143
Justice Samuel Alito, writing for four Justices, also relied
upon a reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine
whether the GPS surveillance constituted a Fourth Amend-
ment search.144  After roundly criticizing the majority for
adopting an outdated Fourth Amendment theory, Justice Alito
concluded that long-term GPS surveillance for most offenses
would be a Fourth Amendment search.  However, Justice Alito
left unanswered exactly how to define “long-term” and “most
offenses.”145
The result—post-Jones—is that courts facing Fourth
Amendment questions about locational data or other informa-
tion must analyze both the reclaimed physical intrusion theory
and the reasonable expectation of privacy theory to determine if
a Fourth Amendment search has occurred.  Neither theory has
been fully developed to reflect the digital world, and the Court’s
most recent Fourth Amendment and technology case, Riley v.
California,146 only adds to the uncertainty.
Riley involved the Court’s first attempt to reconcile
smartphone data and Fourth Amendment doctrine.  The case
itself asked whether police need a warrant to search a
smartphone incident to arrest.147  David Leon Riley had been
stopped for driving without a license, and guns had been recov-
141 Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
142 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
143 Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
144 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
145 Id. at 964 (“Under this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a
person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that
our society has recognized as reasonable.  But the use of longer term GPS moni-
toring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”
(internal citation omitted)).
146 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
147 Id. at 2480.
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ered from his car.  Police believed Riley might be involved in
gang violence.  In scrolling through the data in Riley’s
smartphone after his arrest, police uncovered an incriminating
photograph later used against him in trial.  Riley moved to
suppress the warrantless search of his smartphone data inci-
dent to arrest.
The difficulty for the Court was that blind application of
non-digital precedent to a digital problem did not offer much
Fourth Amendment protection.148  In an earlier case, United
States v. Robinson, the Court had upheld the search of a ciga-
rette pack recovered incident to an arrest.149  The question was
whether searching a smartphone could be considered the
equivalent type of invasion, or whether the digital nature of the
smartphone changed the analysis.  In Riley, the Supreme
Court reasoned that smartphone data was quantitatively and
qualitatively different than searching a cigarette pack or even a
wallet or address book recovered from an arrested suspect.150
In concluding that police did need a warrant before searching
the smartphone data, the Court made several statements rele-
vant to how the Fourth Amendment might conceptualize data
trails arising from smart objects.
First, the Court explicitly recognized that data distorts
traditional application of legal precedent based on physical ob-
jects.151  Data is different because ordinary physical con-
straints and physical limitations fall away in a digital world.152
In the context of a smartphone, data storage allows for vastly
more information to be collected about an individual.153  Data
aggregation allows for a qualitatively more complete picture of
148 Id. at 2484 (recognizing that a mechanical application of precedent might
result in upholding a warrantless search).
149 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
150 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a
qualitative sense from other objects that might be carried on an arrestee’s
person.”).
151 Id.
152 Id. (“One of the most notable distinguishing features of modern cell phones
is their immense storage capacity.  Before cell phones, a search of a person was
limited by physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a
narrow intrusion on privacy.”).
153 Id. (“But the possible intrusion on privacy is not physically limited in the
same way when it comes to cell phones.  The current top-selling smart phone has
a standard capacity of 16 gigabytes (and is available with up to 64 gigabytes).
Sixteen gigabytes translates to millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or
hundreds of videos.  Cell phones couple that capacity with the ability to store
many different types of information: Even the most basic phones that sell for less
than $20 might hold photographs, picture messages, text messages, Internet
browsing history, a calendar, a thousand-entry phone book, and so on.” (internal
citations omitted)).
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that individual to be drawn.154  Data sharing means that the
information is not stored in one central place, but can live on a
device, on a cloud, and in between.155  Finally, the pervasive-
ness of digital technology threatens to invade “the privacies of
life,”156 as actions, thoughts, and patterns become reflected in
digital form.157  In borrowing the language from Boyd, Chief
Justice Roberts brought the informational nature of the Fourth
Amendment invasion full circle.158  Unfortunately, while the
Court appeared to recognize that data is different, it did not
provide any answer for how the Fourth Amendment should
conceptualize data outside of the search incident to arrest con-
text. Riley began reimagining a digital Fourth Amendment, but
provided only an incomplete picture.
As a final issue, the “third party doctrine” creates an addi-
tional problem for the Fourth Amendment.159  As currently un-
derstood, information provided to a third party (e.g., a phone
company, friend, or any of the companies providing devices in
the Internet of Things) loses protection under a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy theory.160  The rationale has been that by
giving the information to another, the giver loses a claim to
154 Id. at 2490 (“Although the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished from
physical records by quantity alone, certain types of data are also qualitatively
different.  An Internet search and browsing history, for example, can be found on
an Internet-enabled phone and could reveal an individual’s private interests or
concerns—perhaps a search for certain symptoms of disease, coupled with fre-
quent visits to WebMD.  Data on a cell phone can also reveal where a person has
been.  Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart phones
and can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only
around town but also within a particular building.”).
155 Id. at 2491 (“To further complicate the scope of the privacy interests at
stake, the data a user views on many modern cell phones may not in fact be stored
on the device itself.  Treating a cell phone as a container whose contents may be
searched incident to an arrest is a bit strained as an initial matter.”); see id.
(“[W]ith increasing frequency, [cell phones] are designed to . . . tak[e] advantage of
‘cloud computing.’  Cloud computing is the capacity of Internet-connected devices
to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself.  Cell
phone users often may not know whether particular information is stored on the
device or in the cloud, and it generally makes little difference.”).
156 Id. at 2495 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
157 Id. at 2490 (“[T]here is an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell
phones but not physical records.  Prior to the digital age, people did not typically
carry a cache of sensitive personal information with them as they went about their
day.”).
158 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
159 See supra note 79.
160 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528 (2006)
(“[Third-party] doctrine provides that if information is possessed or known by
third parties, then, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an individual lacks a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.”).
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privacy over the information.161  Academics have criticized the
doctrine as being ill-suited for the digital age.162  Justice
Sotomayor in Jones suggested reconsidering it.163  Despite
these criticisms, the practical reality remains that because
data is usually held by another entity as well as the owner, a
broad reading of the third party doctrine undermines Fourth
Amendment protection for most data trails.  For purposes of
this Article, the focus is on the direct interception of data trails,
rather than third party collection.  This Article asks whether
the Fourth Amendment protects the direct interception, collec-
tion, and use of data trails by law enforcement.  If the answer is
no, then there is no Fourth Amendment protection for the data
trails we create.  If the answer is yes, then the third party
doctrine may still allow a work-around for law enforcement to
get the same information indirectly (via the third party).  Both
problems need to be addressed, but this Article only focuses on
the direct collection issue.
As can be seen, difficult questions emerge from applying
Fourth Amendment doctrine to this problem of data.  How can
one trespass or physically intrude on data trails which have no
physical being?164  How does one define a threshold line for a
reasonable expectation of privacy test around an intangible,
instantaneous, mutable representation of digital code?  How
should society think about the data arising from the home,
effects, person, and papers?  These are difficult, theoretical
questions that will begin to be considered in the next section.
B. Doctrine and Data Trails
To visualize how traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine
might apply in the Internet of Things world, consider the follow-
161 Compare Kerr, supra note 79, at 564 (justifying the rule based on consent
and the need for “technological neutrality”), with Erin Murphy, The Case Against
the Case for the Third Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and Kerr, 24 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1239, 1241–46 (2009) (criticizing Kerr and debating whether the doc-
trine should exist at all).
162 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 161, at 1242 n.11 (arguing that the rule has
too broad a reach in a world where “we are all citizens of technology”).
163 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring) (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties.”).
164 See, e.g., Steven Kam, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels and a
Doctrine of Cyber-Nuisance, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 427, 440 (2004) (“A modern
understanding of physics blurs the line between actions that qualified traditional
trespass, such as bodily intrusion and bricks thrown through windows and ‘in-
tangible’ invasions now understood to be ‘physical,’ such as particulate matter
(smog, industrial fumes) and electromagnetic energy.” (citation omitted)).
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ing scenario.  Most mornings I wake up and brush my teeth
with a smart toothbrush that has the Wi-Fi capability to be
connected with a smartphone and beyond.165  Data about my
teeth brushing habits is generated and sent to collecting sen-
sors and receptors.  The data reveals something personal about
my hygiene habits, reveals a pattern of my waking time and
sleeping time, and arises from inside my person (my mouth).
The data also derives from my bathroom in my home.  The data
comes from my personal effect (the toothbrush).  The data
when translated into a smartphone record or a dentist’s office
report becomes the equivalent of a paper record of brushing, as
if I manually wrote down the frequency of my teeth brushing
routine in a notebook.  In addition, I subjectively expect that
my oral hygiene habits will not be intercepted by others, and
imagine that such an expectation of privacy is objectively rea-
sonable under a reasonable expectation of privacy theory.  And,
while the analysis changes if I move outside my home, I still
expect the same sort of privacy if I should take my toothbrush
to work, on a business trip, or even use it on my commute in
my car.  At the same time, the unencrypted data from my tooth-
brush could be intercepted by anyone interested in monitoring
me.  Similarly, any data shared with a third party would be in
the hands of third parties and thus, obtainable from those
third parties.  In short, the data trails created by one of many
smart objects in my daily life creates an opportunity to examine
how the Fourth Amendment should consider data that is con-
nected to a smart object, but also distinct from that object.
How should the Fourth Amendment treat direct intercep-
tion of these data trails?  Three distinct approaches emerge
from the current doctrinal uncertainty.  First, one could apply
Justice Scalia’s physical intrusion/trespass theory announced
in Jones.166  Second, one could apply the traditional Katz rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test.167  Third, and relatedly,
one could find that such data deserves no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy because such a claim to privacy is objectively
unreasonable or because it falls within one of the established
exceptions (abandonment, third party doctrine, etc.).168  As
such, the data trails would exist outside of Fourth Amendment
protection.
165 It was a Father’s Day gift.  Don’t judge.
166 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–52 (2012).
167 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967).
168 See Solove, supra note 160; California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–41
(1987).
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This section begins by applying these approaches to data
trails arising from effects, homes, persons, and papers.  This
section examines the Supreme Court’s recent focus on consti-
tutionally protected spaces in United States v. Jones (ef-
fects),169 Florida v. Jardines (homes),170 and Grady v. North
Carolina (persons),171 as well as the traditional reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test, showing that doctrinal gaps exist with
both approaches.  This section also identifies a unifying theme
that demonstrates the Fourth Amendment’s longstanding con-
cern with informational security arising from constitutional
sources.  As will be discussed, the study of data trails reveals
an information-based foundation for the Fourth Amendment
more appropriate for the digital future.
1. “Effects” and Data Trails
The Fourth Amendment protects personal property
through the term “effects.”  In Jones, the majority specifically
located the constitutional harm of placing the GPS device on
the car (the effect), citing to the recognition that the Fourth
Amendment protects our personal property from law enforce-
ment interference.172
Effects have historically been understood to mean personal
property—the objects we possess.173  The early American un-
derstanding distinguished personal property from real prop-
erty.174  Personal property meant physical belongings.  Real
property meant land.  Both were obviously prized by the Foun-
ders, but the constitutional language only focused on the for-
mer.175  While James Madison’s first draft of what would
become the Fourth Amendment originally used the broader
language “their other property,” this language was changed by
the drafting committee to “effects.”176  As Professor Thomas
169 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
170 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
171 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370 (2015).
172 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
173 Altman v. City of High Point, N.C., 330 F.3d 194, 201 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“ ‘[E]ffects’ referred only to personal property, and particularly to goods or move-
ables. See DICTIONARIUM BRITANNICUM (Nathan Baily ed., 1730) (defining ‘effects’ as
‘the goods of a merchant, tradesman . . .’); NOAH WEBSTER, FIRST EDITION OF AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (defining “effect” as “[i]n the
plural, effects are goods; moveables; personal estate”).
174 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
175 Id. at n.7.
176 David E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1077 (2004) (“[A] House of Representatives
Committee changed the phrase ‘and their other property,’ to the narrower lan-
guage ‘effects.’”) (citing HOUSE COMM. OF ELEVEN REPORT (July 28, 1789), reprinted
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Davies has written, “[b]ecause ‘effects’ was usually understood
to designate moveable goods or property (but not real property
or premises), the most likely explanation for the substitution is
that the Committee intended to narrow the scope of interests
protected by Madison’s proposal.”177  Since that time, the
Supreme Court has accepted that “[t]he Framers would have
understood the term “effects” to be limited to personal, rather
than real property.”178
The Founding generation prized the protection of personal
property not simply because it conveyed ownership or material
security, but also because these objects protected self-expres-
sion, dignity, and personal relationships.179  In a recent article,
Professor Maureen Brady examined the neglected history of
effects in the Founding Era.180  Specifically, she identified the
concern surrounding Founding-era searches of clothing—the
confiscation of which might interfere with one’s status in civi-
lized society (if you did not have the appropriate attire you
could not fully participate in civil society).181  In addition, she
discussed the confiscation of family heirlooms that impacted
connections to particular cultural traditions, religions, and
identities.182  The inclusion of effects, therefore, was more than
about protecting valuable possessions, but also about protect-
in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS
223–24 (Neil H. Cogan ed. 1997)).
177 Davies, supra note 107, at 710–11.
178 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177 n.7 (citing Doe v. Dring, 2 M. & S. 448, 454, 105
Eng. Rep. 447, 449 (K.B.1814)).
179 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971 (1964) (arguing that privacy protects
human dignity and autonomy); Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of Pri-
vacy, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1249, 1277 (2012) (“The history of the Fourth
Amendment amply supports the notion that it protects against the humiliation
and loss of dignity wrought by unreasonable government searches and seizures.”);
Tomkovicz, supra note 13, at 341 (“The core value is, in essence, an interest in R
secrecy—in not having the details of our lives learned or exposed against our
wishes.  The Framers prized this aspect of ‘the right to be let alone’ as an essential
foundation of a free society, and gave it a central place among the basic liberties
enshrined in the Bill of Rights.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
180 Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: Giving
Personal Property Due Protection, 125 Yale L.J. 946, 980–87 (2016).
181 Id. at 987–88 (citing To the Farmers and Planters of Maryland, MD. J., Apr.
1, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 74, 75 (Herbert J. Storing &
Murray Dry eds., 1981) (“Nay, they often search the clothes, petticoats and pock-
ets of ladies or gentlemen (particularly when they are coming from on board an
East-India ship), and if they find any the least article that you cannot prove the
duty to be paid on, seize it and carry it away with them; who are the very scurf and
refuse of mankind, who value not their oaths, and will break them for a
shilling.”)).
182 Id. at 988.
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ing the values of what those objects symbolized.  It was not just
about protecting property but about protecting objects of self-
expression.
Effects populate much of the modern Internet of Things
with the only difference from the Founding Era being the stored
data inside these smart devices and the data trails emanating
from them.  From smart umbrellas that tell you whether it is
going to rain,183 to smart pill bottles to remind you to take your
medicine,184 ordinary effects have become sources of data and
data trails.  As one example, technologist and professor David
Rose describes his vision for the ambient umbrella:185
The Ambient umbrella has one enchanted feature—to
prompt you to take it with you when you head out the door.  A
wireless receiver in the handle of the umbrella connects to
the nationwide Ambient network and receives data from Ac-
cuWeather for your zip code.  If rain is forecast, a ring of
LEDs embedded at the top of the umbrella’s handle glows
and pulses a gentle blue light.186
The umbrella is an effect.  Because it relies on local weather
forecasts, it generates locational data and, of course, weather
forecasts.  If police placed a GPS device on the umbrella to
track the umbrella, Justice Scalia’s analysis in Jones would
control.187  Like the car, the physical placement of the device
with the intent to obtain information would constitute a
search.  But, what if the data trails were just collected by an
investigating agent that could track and read the geolocational
information without physically touching the umbrella.  Is inter-
cepting these signals a search of the effect? As will be explained
below, neither the physical intrusion test nor the Katz test
adequately resolve the issue.
a. Data from Effects: Physical Intrusion/Trespass Test
Under a narrow reading of Jones’s physical intrusion/tres-
pass test, no Fourth Amendment search would occur with the
mere interception of data trails from a smart effect.  According
to Justice Scalia’s theory, the triggering of Fourth Amendment
protection requires some physical trespass no matter how
slight.  Justice Scalia foresaw this issue in Jones, stating
183 ROSE, supra note 31, at 7 (defining an enchanted object as “ordinary things
made extraordinary”).
184 Id. at 9 (describing smart umbrellas).
185 Id. at 109–10.
186 Id. at 109.
187 See supra subpart II.A.
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“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic sig-
nals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analy-
sis.”188  Presumably, according to Justice Scalia’s Jones
theory, intercepting data without a physical trespass means
there is no Fourth Amendment search of the effect.
b. Data from Effects: Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy Test
The concurring Justices in Jones provided a partial answer
to the question of whether data trails from smart effects should
be protected under a reasonable expectation of privacy test.  A
majority of Justices concluded that collecting long-term, aggre-
gated data trails (GPS data) from an effect would constitute a
Fourth Amendment search for most crimes.189  This test helps,
but leaves open many questions.  For example, if the data trails
from the smart umbrella are not aggregated or collected for a
long period of time, does the holding still apply?  One can easily
imagine a scenario in which the next Antoine Jones (carrying
his smart umbrella) enters a narcotics stash house only once,
and the information sought to be introduced in court centers
around that single trip, intercepted as a single point of data.
The carefully worded language in the concurrences—empha-
sizing aggregation and long term tracking—counsels against
an automatic finding of a reasonable expectation of privacy.190
Further, the nature of the data being largely unsecured, and
the actions being publicly observable, also cut against a finding
of a reasonable expectation of privacy.191  While in no way set-
tled, there are good reasons to think that a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test would not automatically or completely
protect the data trails from effects connected in the Internet of
Things.
The Supreme Court’s prior cases involving the reasonable
expectation of privacy in effects also fail to provide guidance in
analyzing data trails.  In part, this may be because the Court
has left “effects” relatively under-theorized.  In United States v.
Chadwick, the Supreme Court established that closed contain-
ers—as effects—were protected by the Fourth Amendment:
“the Fourth Amendment . . . draws no distinctions among ‘per-
188 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012).
189 Id. at 964. (Alito, J. concurring).
190 Id.
191 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984); see also United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements.”).
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sons, houses, papers, and effects’ in safeguarding against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.”192  In Chadwick, the effect
was a closed footlocker, but the court has expanded the protec-
tion of effects to parcels, automobiles, luggage, and the various
closed containers seized by police.193
For closed containers, what has mattered was not what
was in the closed effect (usually contraband in criminal cases),
nor the possibility that the container could be examined (cer-
tainly possible), but instead the fact of concealment:194
For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely
entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majes-
tic mansion, so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush
and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf
claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official
inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked at-
tache´ case.195
As long as the closed container (effect) was in the possession of
the individual and served to conceal the contents from outside
view, the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy and security
of the concealed object.
These two qualifiers—possession and concealment—serve
to limit the Fourth Amendment protection of effects.  If one
loses possession of an object—voluntarily abandons it—the
court has concluded that such relinquishment of control also
relinquishes an expectation of privacy in the object.  In Califor-
nia v. Greenwood, the court held that private trash secured in
opaque bags lost any expectation of privacy because the bags
had been abandoned.196  Similarly, the plain view doctrine has
allowed police to view and seize contraband—effects—in plain
192 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977), abrogated by California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
193 Id. at 11 (“By placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker,
respondents manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from
public examination.  No less than one who locks the doors of his home against
intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is due the
protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause.”).
194 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 598 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“Every citizen clearly has
an interest in the privacy of the contents of his or her luggage, briefcase, handbag
or any other container that conceals private papers and effects from public scru-
tiny.  That privacy interest has been recognized repeatedly in cases spanning
more than a century.”).
195 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
196 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988).
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sight.197  If the possessor of the effect has not excluded others
by concealing the effect, then there is no expectation of privacy.
In the context of data trails, these traditional Fourth
Amendment exceptions become rather distorted.  Data trails
are not really abandoned as much as in use when they leave
the effect.  Data packets are less digital trash at the curb, and
more a digital package to be picked up and used by a third
party.  Nor is the data really in “plain view.”  Special devices are
needed to intercept it, and data are rarely immediately incrimi-
nating, since the transmissions reveal nothing without transla-
tion and analysis.  Thus, just as abandonment theory does not
justify police opening a Federal Express package awaiting pick
up or intercepting an encrypted email, it should not automati-
cally apply to data trails (absent some exception or emer-
gency).198  Yet, the issue is far from resolved.
When it comes to digital analogues, it is not clear how the
Supreme Court might address whether individuals have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in data trails emanating from
smart effects.  Any of these doctrinal approaches could be ap-
plied, and like many Fourth Amendment questions the answer
appears to be left to the Justices to choose as they see fit.  This
uncertainty in outcome has been a common complaint about
the reasonable expectation of privacy test, and one that coun-
sels for a new option.199
2. “Houses” and Data Trails
Principles of property and privacy combine to protect
homes under the Fourth Amendment.200  The Supreme Court
197 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (“The rationale of the
plain-view doctrine is that if contraband is left in open view and is observed by a
police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy and thus no ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment—or at least no search independent of the initial intrusion that gave
the officers their vantage point.”).
198 That said, the Court has been willing to find no expectation of privacy for
scents emanating from closed containers (through a dog sniff) and would presum-
ably find other smells detected from a suspicious bag to fall outside the protection
of a closed container. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
199 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“The Katz test—whether the
individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable—has often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and un-
predictable.”); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(complaining that the reasonable expectation of privacy test was really just “those
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable”).
200 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (“The Fourth Amendment
protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of
privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual’s home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and
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has long emphasized the core understanding that “the Fourth
Amendment stands [for] the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.”201  The primacy of the home has been an oft re-
peated claim in Supreme Court cases202:  “In no quarter does
the Fourth Amendment apply with greater force than in our
homes, our most private space which, for centuries, has been
regarded as ‘entitled to special protection.’”203
Even early on, however, the physical boundary of “houses”
extended outwards to protect the homeowner beyond the four
walls of the home.  The principle of “curtilage” legally (and later
constitutionally) created a buffer space immediately around the
home that was treated like a home.204  Curtilage has been de-
fined to be the “area to which extends the intimate activity
associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home.’”205  As a histori-
cal matter, this expansion was required because many of the
intimacies of early colonial life took place outside the physical
home206:
This dwelling area—called the curtilage—was readily dis-
cernible when the kitchen, the laundry, the springhouse, the
woodshed, and most particularly the “outhouse” were not
within the four walls of the mansion house.  A man of the
19th Century . . . had the same right to resent being sur-
prised by an intruder at 3 a.m. as he walked down the garden
path to the privy as a man of the 20th Century . . . has a right
to resent being surprised by an intruder at 3 a.m. as he walks
specific constitutional terms: ‘The right of the people to be secure in their . . .
houses . . . shall not be violated.’”).
201 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (internal citations omitted); Florida v. Jardines, 133
S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (“[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is
first among equals.”).
202 Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the
Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 913–14 (2010).
203 Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 474 (2011) (quoting Georgia v. Randolph,
547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006)).
204 See generally Catherine Hancock, Justice Powell’s Garden: The Ciraolo
Dissent and Fourth Amendment Protection for Curtilage-Home Privacy, 44 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 551, 557 (2007) (detailing the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
personal and societal values embodied in curtilage and Justice Powell’s dissenting
view).
205 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
206 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1986) (“The protection afforded
the curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area
intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy
expectations are most heightened.”).
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down the hall to the bathroom.  The expectation of privacy is
constant; only the location of the “facility” has changed.207
Curtilage remains protected in the modern day, and the Su-
preme Court has elevated this ancient principle to constitu-
tional status.208  Curtilage currently receives similar protection
as the actual home for Fourth Amendment purposes.209
Futuristic “smart homes” connected to the Internet of
Things are becoming the showcase for sensor technology.
Smart refrigerators, NEST Learning Thermometers, smart light
bulbs, wall sockets, and heating systems have become the test-
ing ground to imagine our integrated future.210  In the smart
home of the future, the lights will turn on as you enter the
room, the heat will kick in when you enter the garage, your
fridge will order milk when you run out, and your preferred
ambient music will match your mood or activities.211  Some of
these innovations have the potential to save energy and money.
Some are simply luxury.  But, all will provide a rather revealing
data trail of your daily habits, patterns, and preferences.212  In
addition, the data coming from tablets, laptop computers,
printers, stereos, microwaves, and other Wi-Fi devices, includ-
ing smart televisions and entertainment systems all can reveal
equivalently personal details about the privacies of life inside
207 Charles E. Moylan, Jr., The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. the Fourth
Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold of “So What?”, 1 S. ILL. U. L.J. 75,
87 (1977).
208 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (“[Curtilage] is so inti-
mately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’
of Fourth Amendment protection.”).
209 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–15 (2013) (“The officers were
gathering information in an area belonging to Jardines and immediately sur-
rounding his house—in the curtilage of the house, which we have held enjoys
protection as part of the home itself.”); see, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and
Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72
MISS. L.J. 51, 63 (2002) (“United States v. Dunn elevated Oliver’s dicta on the
meaning of curtilage to law.” (footnote omitted)).
210 Rutledge et al., supra note 28. R
211 Id.
212 See, e.g., Dean Narciso, Police Seek Utility Data for Homes of Marijuana-
growing Suspects, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Feb. 28, 2011, 11:21 AM), http://www
.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/02/28/police-suspecting-home-pot-
growing-get-power-use-data.html [https://perma.cc/U3JE-523C] (“At least 60
subpoenas are filed each month across the state seeking customers’ energy-use
records from American Electric Power and other utilities.”); Matt Liebowitz, Smart
Electricity Meters Can Be Used to Spy on Private Homes, NBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2002,
4:03 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/45946984/ns/technology_and_science-
security/t/smart-electricity-meters-can-be-used-spy-private-homes/ [https://
perma.cc/NZ9T-HQTH] (“The researchers . . . intercepted the supposedly confi-
dential and sensitive information, and, based on the fingerprint of power usage,
were able to tell not only whether or not the homeowners were home, away or even
sleeping, but also what movie they were watching on TV.”).
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the home.213  In short, the collected data trails from your home
will reveal in intimate detail your daily patterns.
The answer to whether these data trails coming from one’s
home should be protected is relatively straightforward as a
matter of Fourth Amendment precedent.  In a series of cases
applying both the physical intrusion/trespass test and the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test, the Supreme Court has
protected most information emanating from a home. However,
the reasoning of why this protection exists and how it would
apply to data trails is less clear-cut.
a. Data from Houses: Physical Intrusion/Trespass Test
From a traditional physical intrusion perspective, any in-
terception of data trails as a result of physically entering the
house would be covered by the greater protection of the home.
The threshold of the home remains a clear boundary to protect
interception of data by law enforcement inside the home.214
This understanding was reaffirmed in Florida v. Jardines,
although in the context of curtilage.215  The question presented
in Jardines was whether bringing a drug-sniffing dog onto the
curtilage of a home to sniff for the scent of marijuana emanat-
ing from the home was a search for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses.216  Justice Scalia, doubling down on his physical
intrusion theory in Jones,217 stated, “The Amendment estab-
lishes a simple baseline, one that for much of our history
formed the exclusive basis for its protections: When ‘the Gov-
ernment obtains information by physically intruding’ on per-
sons, houses, papers, or effects, ‘a “search” within the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly oc-
curred.’”218  Because the dog crossed the threshold of the cur-
tilage and gathered information, this amounted to a Fourth
213 Sometimes this information is literally intercepted by these smart devices.
See David Goldman, Your Samsung TV Is Eavesdropping on Your Private Conver-
sations, CNN MONEY (Feb. 10, 2015, 6:38 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/
09/technology/security/samsung-smart-tv-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/PX4X-
WW8E].
214 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“It is a ‘basic principle of
Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971))).
215 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1410 (2013).
216 Id.
217 Technically Scalia changed his language from using the word “trespass” to
the term “physical intrusion.” See Kerr, supra note 119, at 91.
218 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
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Amendment search.219  This was so, even though the evidence
(the scent of marijuana) had emanated from the inside of the
house to the outside.
Jardines extended the traditional understanding that all
searches of homes require a warrant to the curtilage.220  Be-
cause the curtilage had been granted home-like protection, and
because the dog was standing on the curtilage when it sniffed,
this physical intrusion resolved the Fourth Amendment
question.
In the context of data trails, this test would protect any
interception of data from inside the curtilage (or within the
home), but might not protect any interception from outside
that protected space.  If, for example, a police officer sniffed221
out an unsecured Wi-Fi signal from the safety of her car, a
strict reading of Jardines would offer no Fourth Amendment
protection because there was no physical invasion or trespass
of property.  Under the application of a physical intrusion the-
ory, some physical intrusion is still necessary to trigger Fourth
Amendment protections.
b. Data from Houses: Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy Test
Three concurring Justices in Jardines approved of Justice
Scalia’s property-based approach, but also signaled that the
case could just have easily been decided on reasonable expec-
tation of privacy grounds.222  This outcome, they argued, had
219 Id. (“That principle renders this case a straightforward one.  The officers
were gathering information in an area belonging to Jardines and immediately
surrounding his house—in the curtilage of the house, which we have held enjoys
protection as part of the home itself.  And they gathered that information by
physically entering and occupying the area to engage in conduct not explicitly or
implicitly permitted by the homeowner.”).
220 Id. at 1414–15 (“We therefore regard the area ‘immediately surrounding
and associated with the home’—what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’  That principle has ancient and
durable roots. Just as the distinction between the home and the open fields is ‘as
old as the common law,’ so too is the identity of home and what Blackstone called
the ‘curtilage or homestall,’ for the ‘house protects and privileges all its branches
and appurtenants.’” (internal citations omitted)).
221 See generally Shaina Hyder, The Fourth Amendment and Government Inter-
ception of Unsecured Wireless Communications, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 937, 939
(2013) (arguing that “the Fourth Amendment should prohibit the government
from intercepting unsecured Wi-Fi signals”); Mani Potnuru, Limits of the Federal
Wiretap Act’s Ability to Protect Against Wi-Fi Sniffing, 111 MICH. L. REV. 89, 95
(2012) (noting that it is unclear whether unsecure Wi-Fi networks fall within the
Federal Wiretap Act’s protection).
222 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1418 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring)
(“The Court today treats this case under a property rubric; I write separately to
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been dictated ten years earlier when Justice Scalia himself
wrote Kyllo v. United States, which expressly prohibited the
technological interception of information from the home under
a reasonable expectation of privacy test.223
Kyllo involved the use of a sense-enhancing thermal imag-
ing device that could capture heat signals emanating from a
home.224  Police believed that Danny Kyllo was growing mari-
juana and that heat lamps could be detected using the thermal
imaging device.  An agent sat in his car and directed the ther-
mal imaging device at Kyllo’s home and recorded unusual heat
patterns consistent with growing marijuana.  The question was
whether this use of technology to capture heat data was a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes.  In so holding, Justice
Scalia reasoned,
We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical “intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area,” . . . constitutes a
search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is
not in general public use.225
This was so even though the heat was captured leaving the
house, was invisible to the naked eye, and didn’t reveal many
private details (except for the location of the heat sources).
Going beyond the case at hand and foreseeing the danger of
future technology that could invade constitutionally protected
spaces and sources of private activity, Justice Scalia explained:
But just as a thermal imager captures only heat emanating
from a house, so also a powerful directional microphone
picks up only sound emanating from a house—and a satellite
capable of scanning from many miles away would pick up
only visible light emanating from a house.  We rejected such a
mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz,
where the eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves
note that I could just as happily have decided it by looking to Jardines’ privacy
interests.”).
223 Id. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“Jardines’ home was his property; it
was also his most intimate and familiar space.  The analysis proceeding from each
of those facts, as today’s decision reveals, runs mostly along the same path.  I can
think of only one divergence: If we had decided this case on privacy grounds, we
would have realized that Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150
L.Ed.2d 94 (2001), already resolved it.”).
224 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (“In order to determine
whether an amount of heat was emanating from petitioner’s home consistent with
the use of such lamps, at 3:20 a.m. on January 16, 1992, Agent Elliott and Dan
Haas used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan the triplex.”).
225 Id. at 34 (internal citations omitted).
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that reached the exterior of the phone booth.  Reversing that
approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of ad-
vancing technology—including imaging technology that
could discern all human activity in the home.226
The concurring Justices in Jardines applied this reasoning to
the marijuana scents emanating from the home into the curti-
lage to find that such information should also be protected
under a reasonable expectation of privacy test.
Similarly, the data trails emanating from a smart house
could be protected under a reasonable expectation of privacy
theory.  Just as the heat patterns in a house reveal personal
information—as Justice Scalia memorably put it—including
“at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily
sauna and bath,”227 the data patterns of when the bathroom
light turns off, or the coffee pot turns on, or the fridge opens
reveal personal information about the homeowner’s daily pat-
terns.  Smart devices present exactly the type of technology
that can “discern all human activity in the home.”228  This con-
stitutional protection from exposure exists, even over the Kyllo
dissenters’ argument that “emissions from the outside of a
dwelling” should not fall within the Fourth Amendment’s lan-
guage guaranteeing the people “to be secure in their . . .
houses.”229  Information emanating from the house, even cap-
tured outside the house, falls within the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.
Applying Kyllo to the Internet of Things, data trails from
smart houses should remain protected under the traditional
reasonable expectation of privacy approach.  As with many
things involving homes and the Fourth Amendment, the pro-
tection of a home remains strong even in a digital world.
3. “Persons” and Data Trails
The Fourth Amendment protects persons from being phys-
ically searched and seized.230  Traditionally, this has meant
226 Id. at 35–36.
227 Id. at 38.  Technology through the Internet of Things might also reveal
which room she took her bath, the water usage, the temperature in the room, and
where in the house she went before and after that moment of relaxation.
228 Id. at 35–36.
229 Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Thus, the notion that heat emissions
from the outside of a dwelling are a private matter implicating the protections of
the Fourth Amendment (the text of which guarantees the right of people ‘to be
secure in their . . . houses’ against unreasonable searches and seizures (emphasis
added)) is not only unprecedented but also quite difficult to take seriously.”).
230 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (“Obviously, not all personal
intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons.  Only
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that police need probable cause to arrest and to search a per-
son’s body, including inside his or her clothing,231 and “reason-
able suspicion” to physically seize his or her person.232  In
ordinary cases, this has meant that the human body and the
information located on and around the human body has been
designated a protected constitutional space.  Physical intru-
sion into this space clearly implicates the Fourth Amendment.
But, the protection has not been limited to invasions of the
body or mere physical touching.  Cases involving urinalysis
collection have expanded the protections to the collection of
biological material.233  In the seizure context, the Supreme
Court identified physical touching as the simple line to deter-
mine whether the Fourth Amendment has been implicated or
not.234  In the search context, the analysis has grown more
complicated.
The early history of the Fourth Amendment offers little
assistance in defining how the physical body—as a core pro-
tected space—should be protected.  Obviously biometrics and
genetic surveillance were not at issue, but even bodily inva-
sions received little attention at the time of the Founding.  As
Professor Jules Epstein has noted,
[T]he privacy concerns in 1792 and thereafter did not involve
genetics or even invasions of one’s body, but searches of a
home or ship for papers or contraband or arrests (seizures) of
a person. Searches of the person’s clothing and possessions
occurred appurtenant to lawful arrests and were accepted as
an unquestioned right.235
Underlying this lack of concern for bodily searches was the
reality that there was little evidence to be gained by searching
the body in this early era.  This assumption that the body can-
not provide evidence in a criminal case has been refuted with
the growth of fingerprinting, DNA testing, and other forensic
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”).
231 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 376 (1993).
232 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20, 27 (creating test); id. at 37 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (describing majority’s test as one based on “reasonable suspicion”).
233 Maclin, supra note 209, at 140.
234 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (“The word ‘seizure’
readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force
to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.”).
235 Jules Epstein, “Genetic Surveillance”—The Bogeyman Response to Familial
DNA Investigations, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 141, 149–50 (2009). Some
scholars have even gone farther in arguing that protection of the personal body
was not part of the original Fourth Amendment. See David E. Steinberg, Sense-
Enhanced Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 465, 480 (2007).
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science.236  Many cases now rise or fall on biological material
removed from the human body.
Because health innovations have been at the forefront of
the Internet of Things, questions about data trails from the
human body raise fascinating constitutional issues.  The
“quantified self” movement—still, admittedly just developing—
has focused largely on health innovation.237  For example, im-
plantable medical devices can monitor heart functioning,
smart bandages can monitor the state of a healing wound, and
fitness bands can measure the everyday patterns of sleeping,
walking, and the wearer’s corresponding heart rate.238  Data
trails emerging from inside your body (implantables), on your
skin (smart bandages), and through a device attached to your
wrist (a Fitbit or equivalent) provide a revealing profile about
your current health.239
Are these data trails part of the person for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes?  Certainly the data coming from inside your
body seems largely a manifestation of your person, but is it the
same thing as your person for Fourth Amendment purposes?
Is there a constitutional difference between a police officer plac-
ing his ear directly against your chest to listen to an elevated
heartbeat, using a highly sensitive audio sensor to hear your
heartbeat, or intercepting the digital trail of your Fitbit heart-
beat?  All of them reveal the same private information, but do
they all constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment?
a. Data from Persons: Physical Intrusion/Trespass Test
Physically obtaining biological material from inside one’s
body has long been held to be a Fourth Amendment search.240
In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court had to address
whether the forcible withdrawal of blood constituted a Fourth
236 See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert
Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1342–43
(2004) (noting that the growing importance of DNA evidence has led to legislatively
and judicially created rights to expert assistance for defendants); Seth F. Kreimer
& David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence and Postconvic-
tion DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 553–54 (2002) (discussing the contested
nature of access to DNA evidence in post-conviction proceedings).
237 See supra Part I.
238 Swan, supra note 32, at 218, 222 (“It is estimated that 80 million wearable
sensors will be in use for health-related applications by 2017 . . . . These stretcha-
ble electronics track and wirelessly transmit information such as heart rate, brain
activity, body temperature, and hydration level . . . .”).
239 Olson, supra note 50.
240 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–72 (1966).
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Amendment search.241  In so holding, the Court reasoned, “The
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect per-
sonal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State.”242  While the search in Schmerber was held reasonable,
the taking of blood to prove intoxication did constitute a Fourth
Amendment search.243
In subsequent cases, compelled blood tests244 and
breathalyzers245 have been understood to involve physical in-
trusions on persons for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Any
physical touching of the person to obtain evidence has been
considered a Fourth Amendment search.  “Persons” has also
been extended to include clothing, items in pockets, undergar-
ments, socks, and other extensions of the body.  While these
items could have been considered effects worn on the person,
most courts simply referred to the protection of persons and
looked to see if the items were physically examined.  These
early cases offer little help with the problem of data trails, as
the interception of information from smart medical devices
does not require physical intrusion into the body (or even pock-
ets) of the suspects.
Of relevance to the analysis, however, is the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Grady v. North Carolina applying the
physical intrusion test from Jones to “persons.”246  In Grady,
the Supreme Court held that the physical placement of a GPS
monitor on a convicted sex offender under state-ordered moni-
toring is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.247  Citing
Jones and Jardines, the Court held that “[i]n light of these
decisions, it follows that a State also conducts a search when it
attaches a device to a person’s body, without consent, for the
purpose of tracking that individual’s movements.”248  Like
Jones, central to the Court’s reasoning was that the device
241 Id.
242 Id. at 767.
243 Id.
244 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (“We have
long recognized that a ‘compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood to be analyzed
for alcohol content’ must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search.”).
245 Id. at 616–17 (“Much the same is true of the breath-testing procedures . . . .
Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires the produc-
tion of alveolar or ‘deep lung’ breath for chemical analysis . . . implicates similar
concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test we considered in
Schmerber, should also be deemed a search.” (internal citations omitted)).
246 See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370 (2015).
247 Id.
248 Id.
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physically touched the individual, and also that the device was
“designed to obtain information.”249
Grady stands for the proposition that “persons” can be
considered searched when, in fact, persons are not being phys-
ically searched (but are simply subject to the interception of
personal data trails about their location).  The key, however, at
least from Grady, is that there is some physical intrusion/
contact with the person to obtain the information.  This reality
obviously does not cover non-physical interception of data
trails from smart devices located on persons.
b. Data from Persons: Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy Test
With the exception of Grady, most of the Court’s bodily
integrity search cases occurred during the time when the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test was dominant.250  In these
earlier cases, the line between physical intrusion (drawing
blood from the body) and non-physical intrusion (testing urine
excreted from the body) remained blurred by this privacy focus.
The Supreme Court was clear that physical intrusion into a
body to obtain information violated a reasonable expectation of
privacy, even if such a search is a relatively minor physical
intrusion.251  But the Court also protected bodily excretions
such as breath or urine which have left the body and could be
examined separately from the person.  These cases—although
arising out of the special needs doctrine—help guide the analy-
sis of how the reasonable expectation of privacy test might
protect data trails from smart devices in and on persons.
The Court’s urinalysis decisions recognized that both the
extraction of biological material and testing of that biological
material involved an expectation of privacy.252  By analogy, col-
249 Id. at 1371 (“The State’s program is plainly designed to obtain information.
And since it does so by physically intruding on a subject’s body, it effects a Fourth
Amendment search.”).
250 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (“In light of our society’s concern for the
security of one’s person . . . it is obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating
beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.  The ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain
physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee’s privacy interests.”
(internal citations omitted)).
251 But see Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (“In light of the
context of a valid arrest supported by probable cause respondent’s expectations of
privacy were not offended by the minor intrusion of a brief swab of his cheeks.”).
252 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617–18 (“Because it is clear that the collection and
testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recog-
nized as reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously,
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lection of data trails from an embedded health device could be
treated like bodily waste that, while no longer part of the per-
son and not valuable in the traditional sense, still deserves
privacy protection.  If the content of one’s vial of urine can
claim a reasonable expectation of privacy, then so could the
digital equivalent of personal health data.
Admittedly, tension exists in the doctrine surrounding bio-
logical material found outside the person.  On the less protec-
tive side, collection of shed DNA has largely remained outside
of Fourth Amendment protection, even though the revealing
properties of genetic material are greater than those collected
from breath or urine.253  DNA, in fact, presents a difficult anal-
ogy for the puzzle of data trails.  DNA on the person is obviously
as protected as the person, just like data in a smart object is
protected when it is within the smart effect.  Courts, however,
have initially been willing to separate out the protection of the
person from shed DNA.254  The shed DNA trail does not auto-
matically gain the protection of the person once separated from
the person.  The data trail analogy would be that once sepa-
rated from the smart device, the data loses the protection of the
device.  The result could be that biological trails and data trails
could be collected without any Fourth Amendment check.255
and we agree, that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth
Amendment.”).
253 See David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1180
(2014) (“Courts have uniformly rejected claims that the Fourth Amendment bars
the police from collecting ‘abandoned’ or ‘shed’ DNA, and it is generally assumed
that DNA profiles, once lawfully collected, can be retained and searched indefi-
nitely.” (footnote omitted)); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned”
DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 866–69
(2006); Ken Strutin, DNA and the Double Helix of Constitutional Rights, N.Y. L.J.,
July 22, 2014, at 5.
254 See, e.g., Williamson v. State, 993 A.2d 626, 634–35 (Md. 2010) (no expec-
tation of privacy in DNA on discarded cup); Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d
341, 356–57 (Mass. 2007) (no expectation of privacy in DNA on cigarette butts
and water bottle left in police interview room); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 37
(Wash. 2007) (no expectation of privacy in DNA on envelope mailed to detective);
see also Joh, supra note 253, at 858 (discussing whether the Fourth Amendment
protects individuals against government collection of samples of DNA that individ-
uals leave behind).
255 Also on the less protective side, the sharing of biological and health data
through smart devices provides an additional challenge to a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.  One of the most common consumer devices in the Internet of
Things has been a fitness monitor through a Fitbit, Apple Watch, or other device.
This device attaches to a person’s wrist and reveals biological health data to them
and the contracting company.  Consumers can voluntarily share the data with
friends and family, although not usually with the government.  The question of
whether this data deserves a reasonable expectation of privacy is wide open due to
the expanded audience of who has access to the data and the impact of the Third-
Party Doctrine.
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As a final piece of the puzzle, the concurring Justices in
Jones supported the idea that aggregated, long-term collection
of data trails can be a search for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses.256  If the long-term geolocational surveillance can be
protected, one might imagine the long-term health information
of a person would be even more closely protected.  In fact,
Jones provides an argument for expanding the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy for persons beyond mere bodily integrity to
a broader conception of personhood.  In Jones, Justice
Sotomayor eloquently explained the associational and expres-
sive interests in being able to travel and live free from govern-
ment surveillance, as well as referencing personal health
information exposed by trips to clinics, surgeons, or psychia-
trists.257  These health choices and activities involve personal
autonomy, family, religion, and other manners of self-
expression.
Of course, the reality is that the Justices in Jones failed to
resolve the hard questions of what that expectation of privacy
would look like beyond the facts in Jones.  While intercepting
health data and long-term monitoring of health information
from an individual’s body intuitively seems invasive enough to
violate an expectation of privacy, the current Court simply has
not ruled on it.
4. “Papers” and Data Trails
The Fourth Amendment protects papers, reflecting the im-
portance of freedom of thought, expression, and communica-
tion.258  In an era of quill and paper and the primacy of the
printed word, the Founders’ documents, letters, books, and
diaries could reveal deeply personal, overtly political, or associ-
ational sentiments.259
Historically, private papers, including documents and
pamphlets that challenged governmental power served as a
256 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); id. at 962–63 (Alito, J., concurring).
257 See id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing People v. Weaver, 909
N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)).
258 Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 112, 122 (2007).
259 See United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1014 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kozinski,
C.J., dissenting) (“But the Founders were as concerned with invasions of the mind
as with those of the body, the home or personal property—which is why they gave
papers equal rank in the Fourth Amendment litany.”); see also id. at 1018 (“The
Founding generation recognized that the seizure of private papers also under-
mines freedom of speech.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-3\CRN304.txt unknown Seq: 50 28-MAR-17 9:53
596 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102:547
central point of contestation in the Founding era.260  Famous
English cases involving the search of papers seized to investi-
gate and silence critics of the King received broad attention in
the Colonies.261  The case of John Wilkes, who was targeted for
writing mocking articles about King George III, but who, in
turn, sued the investigating officers for taking his papers, be-
came a cause ce´le`bre for the protection of private docu-
ments.262 Entick v. Carrington, another British legal challenge
protesting the seizure of private documents, has long served as
the paradigmatic example of how confiscating private papers
can chill free expression.263  Entick, like Wilkes, challenged the
search and seizure of his papers and won a symbolic victory for
the right to dissent.
Protecting private papers, thus, became a central rallying
cry in the creation of constitutional liberty.264  Echoes of this
concern can be observed in early state constitutions, and
helped generate the Bill of Rights’ explicit reference to unrea-
sonable searches and seizures of papers (as distinct from ef-
fects).265  Not surprisingly then, in the first cases involving the
260 See Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History
of Private “Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 49, 52 (2013) (“The Fourth Amendment refers to ‘papers’ because the
Founders understood the seizure of papers to be an outrageous abuse distinct
from general warrants.”).
261 Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L.
REV. 869, 875–76 (1985) (“The fourth amendment is based in large part on six
celebrated English court decisions, including Entick v. Carrington, handed down
in the two decades prior to the American Revolution.  All six cases involved unsuc-
cessful efforts by the English government to apprehend the authors and publish-
ers of allegedly libelous publications, most notably the then famous North Briton
No. 45.  The decisions attracted considerable public attention in both England
and the American colonies.” (footnotes omitted)); Craig M. Bradley, Constitutional
Protection for Private Papers, 16 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 461, 463
(1981) (“Protection of private papers from governmental search and seizure is a
principle that was recognized in England well before our Constitution was
framed.”).
262 See Schnapper, supra note 261, at 912–13 (“The Wilkes controversy also
directly influenced the framers of the fourth amendment.  The English search and
seizure cases received extensive publicity in England and in America, and the
Wilkes case was the subject of as much notoriety and comment in the colonies as
it was in Britain.  Wilkes’ cause generated many supporters among American
colonists, some of whom became key figures in the framing of the Constitution.”).
263 See Dripps, supra note 260, at 72–75 (“We have long known that the
tribulations of Wilkes were followed closely in the colonies . . . .  The ‘seizure of
papers’ was not an obscure issue of law; it was the stuff of everyday political
conversation in the colonies.”).
264 See TASLITZ, supra note 108, at 18 (“The abusive searches and seizures that
captured colonial Americans’ attention frequently involved state efforts to sup-
press dissent.”).
265 E.g., VA. DECLARATION OF RTS. § 10; MASS. DECLARATION OF RTS. § XIV; see
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 584
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interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and private papers—
Ex parte Jackson266 and Boyd267—the Supreme Court had lit-
tle difficulty in explaining the protection in clear and unequivo-
cal terms.  In Ex parte Jackson, the court reasoned that letters
and sealed packages deserved protection: “The constitutional
guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers
against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their
papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may
be.”268  This protection continued even though the mailed let-
ters had left the personal control of the sender.  In Boyd, the
court referenced Entick and the English cases declaring that a
demand for documents under penalty of contempt was the
equivalent of a search and seizure for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses.269  As discussed earlier, Boyd’s protection of commercial
documents as “papers” exists as the high-water mark for con-
stitutional protection, spurring a reconsideration and eventual
rejection of such broad security of documentary evidence.270
Specifically, this protective vision of “papers” has been re-
considered through a series of cases which have expanded gov-
ernmental power to compel the production of private papers
through legal process, as well as to carve out exceptions to
shared communications via the third party doctrine.271  Docu-
ments can be subpoenaed.272  Documentary privacy can be
(1983) (“The concerns voiced by the Antifederalists led to the adoption of the Bill of
Rights.”); Dripps, supra note 260, at 79 (“The want of a Bill of Rights was the
central objection to the proposed Constitution of 1789, and this objection in-
cluded explicit references to search and seizure.”).
266 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
267 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
268 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
269 Stuntz, supra note 109, at 423 (noting the Court’s holding that the sub-
poena in Boyd was “the functional equivalent of a search or seizure”); see Morgan
Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and
Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 592–93 (1996).
270 See Solove, supra note 258, at 138 (“The days of Boyd have long come to an
end . . . .  The third-party doctrine and doctrine on public surveillance have also
severely curtailed the Fourth Amendment’s protection of personal writings, read-
ing habits, associations, and other First Amendment activities.”).
271 For example, after Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), Congress
passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (2013), and
after Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), Congress passed the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (2013).
272 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 73 (1906) (ruling that it was “quite clear
that the search and seizure clause of the 4th Amendment was not intended to
interfere with the power of courts to compel, through a subpoena duces tecum, the
production, upon a trial in court, of documentary evidence”).
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deemed waived by revealing it to third parties.273  Warrants for
digital evidence can include essentially all of the digital files in
a computer or device.274  Business records, like those in Boyd,
can no longer claim blanket protection under the Fourth or
Fifth Amendments.  While cases with countervailing constitu-
tional claims involving freedom of the press,275 political
speech,276 personal communication,277 and liberty278 have
managed to preserve some protection, personal papers remain
much less protected than under Boyd.
This constitutional reality presents a fascinating issue in
an era of digital information.  From one perspective, the In-
ternet of Things can be reconceived as an ongoing paper trail of
digital information.  After all, a single smartphone can become
the source of all letters (e-mail), documents (notes, diaries,
work), books (e-readers), and dissenting pamphlets (angry
hashtags or blog posts).  In fact, one could conceive most smart
objects in the Internet of Things as merely digital papers with
coded information being created and shared.
Digital manifestations of documentary equivalents are eve-
rywhere.  When individuals bank online, a digital paper trail
equivalent to the old-fashioned deposit receipt is created.
When individuals obtain prescription refills through their
smartphone, a digital pharmaceutical receipt is created.  When
cars pass through an automated tollbooth, an electronic de-
posit and record of a transaction is created.  Everything that
273 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 437–41 (1976) (finding no expectation of privacy in
bank records shared with a third-party bank).
274 See Kerr, supra note 14, at 549.
275 See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965); see also Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (“Where the materials sought to be
seized may be protected by the First Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment must be applied with ‘scrupulous exactitude.’” (quoting Stanford,
379 U.S. at 485)); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973) (holding that
seizure of books and films is weighed differently under the Fourth Amendment
than seizure of instruments of a crime).
276 See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 470 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (“[H]istorically the search and seizure power was used to suppress freedom of
speech and of the press . . . . [F]reedom of speech is undermined where people fear
to speak unconstrainedly in what they suppose to be the privacy of home and
office.” (internal citations omitted)).
277 See id. at 449 (“The right of privacy would mean little if it were limited to a
person’s solitary thoughts, and so fostered secretiveness.  It must embrace a
concept of the liberty of one’s communications, and historically it has.”).
278 See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 292–93 (1929) (“Of all the
rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace
and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves, not merely
protection of his person from assault, but exemption of his private affairs, books,
and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others.  Without the enjoyment of
this right, all other rights would lose half their value.”).
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the Founders had in their desks, we have in our computers.
Further, all of the “paper” bank statements, prescriptions, li-
brary receipts, love letters, etc. have been replaced with digital
counterparts.279  If this documentary equivalent is taken seri-
ously as digital papers, then the concept of Fourth Amendment
papers may take a primary place in the protection of personal
privacy or security.
In addition, formal communication has largely turned to
digital means.  E-mails, texts, and other social media commu-
nication have replaced letter writing.280  The U.S. Postal Service
handled about 150 billion pieces of mail in 2014, not an insig-
nificant figure,281 but only about the number of e-mails sent
every day worldwide.282  The same communicative purpose of
letter writing has simply been transformed into digital form.
Finally, many personal reflections, creative thoughts, and
political ideas are also written in digital form.  The next political
manifesto declaring independence will probably be drafted on a
computer rather than on a scroll.  The next public challenge to
political corruption will likely be saved in digital storage rather
than in a wooden desk.  Yet, the substance of what is protected
remains the same.  The fact that paper was the form to capture
ideas should not delimit the protection of Fourth Amendment
“papers” to only that form.  What matters was the protection of
communication, expression, and dissent, not the ink and paper
used to memorialize it.
Despite the growth of digital equivalents of papers, the Su-
preme Court is only just beginning to see how digital informa-
tion may require a reworking of existing doctrine.  The next two
sections apply current Fourth Amendment law to this largely
unresolved problem.
a. Digital Papers: Physical Intrusion Theory
Unlike Jones, Jardines, and Grady, the Supreme Court has
not yet applied the physical intrusion test to a case involving
279 See Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth Amendment in the
Age of Google, National Security, and Digital Papers and Effects, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 153, 170–72 (2011).
280 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2010) (not-
ing that email “is the technological scion of tangible mail”); United States v.
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (2008) (“The privacy interests in [mail and e-mail]
are identical.”).
281 See U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POSTAL FACTS (2014), https://about.usps.com/
who-we-are/postal-facts/postalfacts2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2Z7- R5ZE].
282 See Inbox Overload: 182 Billion Emails Sent Daily Worldwide, CBS NEWS
(July 2, 2014, 1:52 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/inbox-overload-182-
billion-emails-sent-daily-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/2XUZJ9RT].
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papers and new technology.  Generally speaking, the intercep-
tion of data in the form of papers (emails, texts, electronic
receipts) would not involve any physical intrusion.
In Riley, the investigating officers physically manipulated
the smartphone device, entering the passcode, scrolling
through an address book, switching between photo applica-
tions, etc.283  This type of physical touching likely is enough to
constitute a physical invasion of digital papers.  While Riley did
not directly present that issue, the holding that such activity
requires a warrant even incident to arrest likely means that the
Court would consider such physical investigation a search for
Fourth Amendment purposes absent an arrest.284
The physical intrusion test, however, would not provide
protection if the same investigation could be done without
physical contact.  If police could access Riley’s smartphone and
retrieve information, either by tricking the device into sending
data or hacking into it, a doctrinal gap remains about whether
such a digital trespass constitutes a search.285
b. Digital Papers: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Test
Riley broadly suggested that individuals have expectations
of privacy in their digital papers without actually using the
term “reasonable expectation of privacy.”  The language Chief
Justice Roberts used evoked the privacy implications of this
information without affirmatively relying on the traditional the-
ory.  In recognizing the qualitative and quantitative differences
in smartphone data,286 and the revealing nature of the infor-
mation on the phone, the Court signaled a clear recognition
that smart devices filled with the equivalent of digital papers
would be granted some privacy protection.  Equally important,
283 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480–81 (2014).
284 Arthur Leavens, The Fourth Amendment and Surveillance in a Digital World,
27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 709, 719 n.52 (2015) (“In Riley, there was no question
but that the data in the cell phone, the digital version of ‘papers’ or ‘effects,’ was
protected by the Fourth Amendment; the question there was whether the cell-
phone search that uncovered it required a warrant.”).
285 Courts have not answered this question, and in a series of related cases
involving malicious criminal hacking and other data breaches the issue of digital
trespass has been debated with little consensus.  Professor Orin Kerr, in a
thoughtful essay, The Norms of Computer Trespass, sets out a framework for
considering unauthorized computer access a criminal offense. See 116 COLUM. L.
REV. 1143, 1153–61 (2016).
286 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2478 (“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a
qualitative sense from other objects that might be carried on an arrestee’s
person.”).
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the Court also recognized that the data trails existed separate
from the smart effect itself (in the “cloud”), and yet despite
being something else, deserved protection because of the con-
nection to the effect.287
Similarly, in Quon v. City of Ontario, California, the Court
assumed without deciding that individuals might have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the content of text messages
(even messages sent on government issued pagers during work
hours).288  This was so regardless of the content (racy, sexually
explicit messages) and despite the fact that the texts were held
by third parties (the wireless company).  The Court assumed
without deciding that such messages, even in digital form, were
the type of communication worth protecting.289
Both Riley and Quon could be read to adopt protection of
the content of digital papers under a reasonable expectation of
privacy theory, as opposed to the fact of the communication
itself.  Cases and commentary have long supported this dis-
tinction between content and communications data.290 Tele-
phone conversations and transmitting email have received
Fourth Amendment protection.291  Call logs and call lists have
not received similar protection.292  Similarly, the content of
mailed letters remains protected even though the United States
Post Office regularly scans the outside of all mail for postal
addresses and keeps this information in a federal database
without Fourth Amendment concern.293  This distinction be-
tween content and non-content data also may be necessary in
thinking about digital papers because of the role of the third
party doctrine, which still controls the expectation of privacy
for non-content information such as number dialed or other
metadata.294
287 Id. at 2491 (“Cloud computing is the capacity of Internet-connected devices
to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself.”).
288 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).
289 Id.
290 See infra section III.A.1.
291 See supra note 14.
292 See supra text accompanying notes 14–15.
293 Ron Nixon, U.S. Postal Service Logging All Mail for Law Enforcement, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/us/monitoring-of-
snail-mail.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XZ6EVUFW]; J.D. Tuccille, Post Office
Tracks Your Mail (Often Without Proper Authorization), REASON.COM (Oct. 28, 2014,
1:27 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2014/10/28/post-office-also-tracks-your-
communicati [https://perma.cc/KL8D-QZUX].
294 See Chris Conley, Non-Content Is Not Non-Sensitive: Moving Beyond the
Content/Non-Content Distinction, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 821, 824 (2014); Orin S.
Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62
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The question of whether interception of digital papers and
communications violates a reasonable expectation of privacy
remains unresolved.  In some cases, courts have acted to pro-
tect digital information.295  In others, they have not.296  The
addition of growing webs of metadata only increases the uncer-
tainty.  There may exist a different expectation in the privacy of
one’s email and the privacy of to whom the email was sent, but
the courts have not agreed on how to draw the line for all digital
papers and data signals.
Expectations may also depend on the content of the data.
Digital medical records and bank records may be more reason-
ably protected than your daily receipts from Starbucks, which
is why statutory protections covering medical and financial ser-
vices have filled in the constitutional gaps.297  But, such expec-
tations remain complicated by the impact of the existing third
party doctrine and strong law enforcement exceptions, which
currently provide little reasonable expectation of privacy for
records shared with third parties.298  Finally, while Riley recog-
nized the variety of digital information vulnerable to intercep-
tion from our smartphones and the attendant privacy interests,
Riley did not delineate any broader framework for how courts
should treat this data.299
Simply stated, the Supreme Court has not definitively ad-
dressed digital papers in all their various forms.  Virtual inter-
ception of data falls outside the physical intrusion paradigm,
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1020 (2010); Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Dis-
tinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2162–63 (2009).
295 See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (e-mail
protected); see also Courtney M. Bowman, A Way Forward After Warshak: Fourth
Amendment Protections for E-mail, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809, 815–18 (2012)
(discussing an earlier congressional attempt to protect digital privacy from the
third-party doctrine).
296 United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008) (files in a file-
sharing network not protected); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–11
(9th Cir. 2008) (Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and to/from e-mail information
not protected).
297 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936. But see Matthew R. Langley, Hide Your Health: Ad-
dressing the New Privacy Problem of Consumer Wearables, 103 GEO. L.J. 1641,
1647 (2015) (highlighting that, through the advent of smartphones and other
mobile devices, companies have been able to collect sensitive information from
their customers, including their location, political preferences, communications
with contacts, and other types of information).
298 Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Infor-
mation Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemp-
tions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 487 (2013).
299 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–91 (2014); supra notes
146–58 and accompanying text.
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and the ubiquity of the information calls into question the rea-
sonableness of any expectation of privacy.  Echoes of concern
can be heard in the concurrences in Jones300 or the dicta in
Riley301 about how our digital lives reveal too much, but the
Court has not yet settled on a way forward.
C. Reflections on the Current Doctrine: Sources and
Security
Three important insights emerge from the foregoing analy-
sis of the Fourth Amendment and data trails.  First, the ex-
isting Fourth Amendment doctrine does not quite fit the digital
age.  A narrow reading of a physical intrusion/trespass test
leaves many smart objects constitutionally unprotected.  Fur-
ther, privacy is an inapt organizing frame for data trails that
regularly flow out of smart devices.  By design, smart devices
reveal private information to assist personal growth.  The issue
is not so much the privacy of data, but control of that data.
Second, unless the courts wish these ever-increasing data
trails to exist outside constitutional control, a new Fourth
Amendment theory for data trails must be created. While statu-
tory and technological fixes remain possible, the choice to ig-
nore constitutional implications may not be satisfying to courts
or citizens.
Third, despite the doctrinal gap, the Supreme Court’s two
established search theories protect the same core interests
which revolve around information and expression (self or asso-
ciational) that emerges from persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects.  While stated in different terms, and with different
language, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the
centrality of informational security coming from constitution-
ally protected sources.
The study of data trails and the Fourth Amendment high-
lights the importance of constitutional sources and informa-
tional security.  The next section reexamines these two unifying
themes as a foundation to build a more appropriate Fourth
Amendment theory responsive to the challenges of
sensorveillance.
300 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955–57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); see supra notes 140–45 and accom-
panying text.
301 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–85; supra notes 146–58 and accompanying text.
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III
A THEORY FOR PROTECTING SMART DATA UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A “smart” Fourth Amendment must answer the question of
whether data trails deserve constitutional protection.  The cur-
rent doctrine does not directly resolve the issue, but provides
the building blocks for an argument to protect some (but not
all) of these data trails.
This Part argues that protecting data trails from smart de-
vices is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.  Simply stated,
at its core, the Fourth Amendment concerns itself with “infor-
mational security” arising from “constitutional sources.”  De-
fined here, “informational security” centers around personal
information that is secured in some manner from governmental
intrusion.  Defined here, “constitutional sources” means the
textually referenced, “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”302
Both concepts will be discussed in detail below, but broadly
framed the idea emerges as a unifying principle to answer how
data trails fit the Fourth Amendment.
As will be demonstrated, both the trespass/physical intru-
sion theory and the reasonable expectation of privacy theory
seek to protect personal information deriving from constitu-
tionally recognized sources.  The former superficially focuses
on the physical, property intrusion, the latter on the personal,
privacy invasion.  But, both at their deeper core protect some-
thing else besides property or privacy—they protect control
over personal information.303  This Part explains why data
trails should be protected under the Fourth Amendment, and
Part IV explains how the doctrine can adapt to this new digital
age.
A. The Unifying Theme of Informational Security
The next few subsections develop “informational security”
as a unifying theme among the otherwise divergent Fourth
Amendment theories.  As will be detailed, looking at the reason
why the Supreme Court has protected certain constitutional
302 See supra note 3.
303 The reason for protecting Antoine Jones’s car was not the minimal physical
property interference, but the significant informational value of his travels. See
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  The reason for protecting Charlie
Katz’s conversation in a public phone booth was not personal privacy (Katz was
speaking in a quasi-public space to other listeners on the other end), but the
informational value of the content of the call. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
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interests leads directly to the conclusion that smart data falls
within this protected class of information.
This discussion builds upon decades of scholarship by pri-
vacy law experts who have advocated for a focus on informa-
tional privacy.304  Privacy law scholars have explicitly and
implicitly, theoretically and practically articulated the founda-
tional role of privacy behind Fourth Amendment doctrine.305
As discussed later in subpart B, informational security pro-
vides a more limited, but more practical protection than infor-
304 DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 1 (2d ed. 2006) (“Informa-
tion privacy concerns the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information.
Information privacy is often contrasted with ‘decisional privacy,’ which concerns
the freedom to make decisions about one’s body and family. Decisional privacy
involves matters such as contraception, procreation, abortion, and child rearing,
and is at the center of a series of Supreme Court cases often referred to as
substantive due process or the constitutional right to privacy.”); see also Neil M.
Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1089 (2006)
(“Information privacy draws primarily upon the tort law of privacy, state and
federal privacy legislation, and constitutional protections guaranteed by the First
and Fourth Amendments.”); A. Michael Froomkin, supra note 22, at 1463 R
(“[W]hen possible, the law should facilitate informational privacy because the
most effective way of controlling information about oneself is not to share it in the
first place.”).
305 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 195 (2008) (proposing that a viable theory of privacy for the
networked information age must consider the extent to which the “privacy of the
home” has served as a sort of cultural shorthand for a broader privacy interest
against exposure); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1425–26 (2000) (explaining that the
benefits of informational autonomy extend to a wide range of human activity and
choice); Froomkin, supra note 22, at 1502 (theorizing that consumers suffer from R
privacy myopia, in which they sell their data too often and too cheaply); Richards,
supra note 304, at 1089 (referencing the “Information Privacy Law Project,” a
collective effort by a group of scholars to identify a law of information privacy and
to establish information privacy law as a valid field of scholarly inquiry); Schwartz,
supra note 22, at 1612 (arguing that unfettered participation in democratic and R
other fora in cyberspace will not take place without the right kinds of legal limits
on access to personal information); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation:
Personal Information and the Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA
L. REV. 553, 560–61 (1995) (arguing that data protection law must concern itself
with decision making in deliberative autonomy and deliberative democracy); Paul
M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New Privacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2163,
2177 & n.33 (2003) (emphasizing that various authors, independently of each
other, have sought to develop information privacy laws based on the idea of
privacy as a social good); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1087, 1093, 1125–29 (2002) (explaining that privacy should be conceptualized
contextually as it is implicated in particular problems); Daniel J. Solove, Access
and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1137, 1204–05 (2002) (explaining how the Supreme Court has proclaimed that
the constitutionally protected “zone of privacy” extends to decisional privacy and
information privacy); Solove, supra note 22, at 1398 (explaining the “Big Brother” R
metaphor as the longstanding paradigm for conceptualizing privacy problems).
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mational privacy and one that better addresses the problem of
data trails.306
This section traces the theory of informational security
through effects, houses, persons, and papers.  The goal is to
develop the argument that the Fourth Amendment should—
consistent with traditional doctrine—protect personal informa-
tion deriving from these constitutional sources.
1. Effects and Informational Security
Central to the protection granted effects has been securing
personal information about those effects.  The sparse Founding
Era literature suggests a focus on protecting objects which
revealed something about the owner—religion, culture, status,
or family associations.307  Searching and seizing a colonist’s
religious objects was not offensive simply because it interfered
with property rights, but because searching revealed personal
information about family and faith.  Rummaging through bed-
room drawers was not solely about the inviolate nature of prop-
erty but, as the early history suggested, also about revealing
information that might be contained in those drawers.  Inter-
preted one way, the protection of effects has largely been the
protection of what the personal effects revealed or contained.
Similarly, while Justice Scalia attempted to ground his
Jones argument in property rights, the harm of affixing the
GPS device was not in any real sense to physical property (the
car was undamaged).308  The real harm was exposing the re-
vealing personal data about the effect (car).  Placing the device
on the car might have been a seizure, but what made it a
search was collecting the locational data intercepted by police
(the “use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements”).309
The “use” in that case was the capturing of data trails via
satellite transmissions communicated by cell phone to a gov-
ernment computer.310  By using the car to track its owner, the
government invaded the informational security of the effect.
Justice Scalia’s Jones analysis requires both parts—trespass
306 My focus on informational security addresses the centrality of informa-
tional control.  The choice of prioritizing “security” over “privacy” has its origin in
the work of Professor Tom Clancy and others who have argued that security
provides a better frame of Fourth Amendment protection than privacy. See infra
note 342. R
307 See supra text accompanying notes 180–181.
308 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012); supra subpart II.A.
309 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
310 Id. at 948 (“By means of signals from multiple satellites, the device estab-
lished the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100 feet, and communicated that loca-
tion by cellular phone to a Government computer.”).
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plus use—and as Justice Alito argues in his concurrence,
neither alone should constitute a search under Scalia’s reason-
ing.311  In holding that this interception/collection was a
Fourth Amendment search, Justice Scalia implicitly acknowl-
edged the centrality of informational security.312  What mat-
tered was securing the information coming from the effect, not
just securing the effect itself.
The concurring Justices in Jones also focused on the per-
sonal information revealed from the GPS device.313  The reason
a twenty-eight-day tracking of locational data became a search
rested solely on the informational exposure that resulted.
Such collection of personal data points (touching on associa-
tional, health, and other private travels) became of constitu-
tional significance when the data trails could be revealing of
private, personal actions.314  The expectation of privacy was
not about expectations from the effect (the car) itself, but the
information to be inferred about the travels of the car.  This
personal information essentially radiating off the car is what
created the constitutional harm.
Perhaps less protective, the traditional reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test for effects—with its focus on closed contain-
ers and exceptions for publicly disclosed material—can be
reconceptualized as only protecting the information secured
(“concealed”) from others.315  Under the traditional doctrine,
what is protected is the information inside the effect, less pri-
vacy of the effect itself.  Individuals can only claim a reasonable
expectation of privacy by taking steps to protect that informa-
tion (placing it in a footlocker, parcel, or briefcase).316  If the
information is revealed to the outside world, then the plain view
311 Id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring).  While Justice Scalia does not address this
argument, such a reading makes sense if we remember that the ultimate question
is whether there was a search, not a seizure.  Touching the car or putting the GPS
device on the car might constitute a seizure of property (converting the property to
government use), but for there to be a search, some information must be captured
by government agents.  In other words, if the police had stuck the GPS device on
the car but no information could be collected, it would not be a search.  If the
police had simply collected the information without touching the car, it would not
be a search.
312 See supra text accompanying notes 180–181.
313 Farahany, supra note 132, at 1249 (“The concurrences in Jones under- R
scored that in the information age, defendants are less concerned about intru-
sions upon their real property and more concerned about intrusions upon their
information.”).
314 See supra subpart II.B.
315 See supra subpart II.A.
316 See supra subsection II.B.1.b.  As may be evident, the logic of Jones and of
the more traditional Fourth Amendment closed-container cases exists in some
tension.
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exception controls.  If the information is voluntarily disclosed,
then control over the information is deemed abandoned.  In
this way, the reasonable expectation of privacy of effects is
really the reasonable expectation of information security about
those effects.  This reality would be so even in a world of x-rays
and backscatter technology, which as a technical matter could
expose the contents of a footlocker.  The fact that a citizen is
aware that such technology exists does not eviscerate an ex-
pectation of privacy in a closed container.  What matters is not
that the information, in fact, remains private, but the steps
taken to secure (conceal) the information and exclude others
from seeing it.
In studying effects, two points emerge: first, some effects
are protected because of what information they reveal about
the possessor of the effect, and second, some effects are only
protected if steps are taken to maintain control of the informa-
tion in the effect.  But, both focus on the informational content
and control of information from the physical object not just the
physical protection of the object itself.  Data from smart effects,
thus, also should be protected as part of the informational
security of the effect.  As long as steps are taken to conceal,
control, or secure the smart data, then it can claim some pro-
tection under the Fourth Amendment.  As will be discussed in
Part IV, such a claim presents practical difficulties, but as a
conceptual matter, the data from smart effects can be pro-
tected as part of the effect itself.
2. Houses and Informational Security
A more obvious example of informational security can be
seen in the Supreme Court’s discussion of houses.  The princi-
ple of protecting private property plainly influenced the
Supreme Court’s approach to homes.317  But, the sanctity of
what happens inside the home—information about the people
and activities in the home—provides the true justification for
why homes have been so privileged.318 Jardines focused on
317 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (recognizing that “[t]he
great end for which men entered into society was to secure their property” (quot-
ing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1029 (1765))); Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978) (“Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must
have a source outside the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of
real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and per-
mitted by society.”).
318 Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the
Limits of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REV.
889, 894 (2004) (“There has long been significant overlap between property rights
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property control—who can exclude,319 who had license to ap-
proach—as a mechanism to protect the activities inside the
home.320 Kyllo focused on expectations of privacy and the ac-
tivities that could be revealed about what happens inside
homes.321  But both, at base, involved protecting the home as a
space to allow human activities to flourish.  And, neither in-
volved merely the protection of the home as a physical struc-
ture independent of what happened inside the home.  For that
reason it is unsurprising that the protection of “the home” also
covers spaces like apartments, hotels, and other places of per-
sonal privacy.322  The surrounding form matters less than what
happens inside.
Further, both lines of analysis protect information coming
from the home that is no longer part of the home.  Heat, conver-
sations, and smells are protected because of their source (the
home).  The fact that they came from a constitutionally pro-
tected space is what controls.  Emanations are not seen as
separate from the source, but constitutionally protected be-
cause of the source.  In the home context this is even true for
not very private information (like heat use).  As Justice Scalia
said in Kyllo, “The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home
has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity
of information obtained. . . .  In the home, our cases show, all
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe
from prying government eyes.”323
Similarly, the protection of curtilage acknowledges that
personal activities and private information can exist outside
the home, and yet be covered by the Fourth Amendment pro-
tection of the home.324  The derivative source of the home ex-
tends protections beyond the four walls to other personal
and reasonable expectations of privacy. Privacy is one of the things that people
value about private property.”).
319 David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others from
Private Property: A Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39,
58 (2000) (“The right of a landowner to exclude others is a fundamental part of the
equally fundamental Constitutional Right to the enjoyment of private property.”).
320 What was being protected in Jardines was private information (the scent of
marijuana) coming from inside a person’s home, but captured outside the home.
Jardines shows that the Fourth Amendment recognizes a property-based protec-
tion of revealing information that comes from constitutional sources (homes), but
have left (are emanating from) the source. See supra subsection II.B.2.a.
321 See supra text accompanying note 224.
322 Espinoza v. State, 454 S.E.2d 765, 767 (Ga. 1995) (apartments); Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (hotels).
323 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
324 Ferguson, supra note 63, at 1287–88.
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activities that happen nearby but clearly exist outside the
home.
With homes, the principle of informational security be-
comes rather evident.  Whether protecting information about
activities inside the house, spaces near the house, or informa-
tion about the house that can be captured radiating outside the
four walls, the constitutional protection remains.  Data trails
emanating from the smart home, likewise, can claim a deriva-
tive protection of the home.  Informational security principles
apply both to the human activities and the digital manifesta-
tion of those activities originating from inside the home (even if
collected outside the home).
3. Persons and Informational Security
Again, a unifying theme of protecting personal information
emerges from the case law governing persons. Katz, the case
that establishes that the Fourth Amendment protects “people,
not places” was itself a case involving information being com-
municated by a person to another person.325  The search at
issue involved a conversation—words—captured at some re-
move from the person (the microphone was taped to the top of
the phone booth).326  Katz was neither touched nor even knew
he had had his constitutional rights intruded upon.  The pro-
tection ran toward the information leaving his person (via his
mouth).  The Fourth Amendment secured this information
from interception.
Similarly, physically removing blood from a suspect is obvi-
ously a physical invasion of the person, but what is being regu-
lated is not merely protection from getting jabbed with a needle,
but protection of the revealing information in the blood (intoxi-
cation level, drug results).  The Fourth Amendment protection
is not just about bodily integrity but also security of biological
information.
Likewise, the early reasonable expectation of privacy cases
concerning drug testing of urine turn on the securing of per-
sonal, biological information.327  Urine is generally considered
abandoned.  Once excreted, it is separate from the person.  Yet,
the reason we might still expect some security in its contents is
because of the information it might reveal about the person
325 See supra section II.B.3.
326 Kerr, supra note 127, at 820 (“Katz began with an investigation into an
illegal betting scheme.  The FBI taped a microphone to the roof of a public phone
booth used every morning by a suspect named Charles Katz.”).
327 See supra section II.B.3.
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(health status, pregnancy, drug use, etc.).  The reason for pro-
tecting biological material from government collection (blood,
urine, DNA) is primarily because of the potentially revealing
information in the sample.  For that reason, it may be the case
that the shed DNA cases are erroneously decided328 or perhaps
only applicable to samples recovered from suspects after arrest
(with a corresponding reduced expectation of privacy).329
Most interestingly, Grady’s extension of the Jones and
Jardines rationale to persons reveals the importance of protect-
ing informational security more than principles of property,
dignity, or even privacy. Grady framed the placement of a GPS
device on a person as being the search of a person, even though
there was no actual bodily search.330 Grady presents a perfect
example of how Fourth Amendment doctrine is really about
informational security.  First, Grady was decided completely
removed from the property-based justification that undergirds
Justice Scalia’s opinions in Jones/Jardines.  Whereas Jones
brought back considerations of trespass to chattel, and
Jardines explicitly referenced property considerations of li-
cense, trespass, curtilage, and consent to homes, Grady in-
volves no property concepts.331  There was no concern of
converting private property to government use.  There was no
concern of surreptitious collection that somehow interfered
with property rights to use, exclude, or share.  Instead, the
Supreme Court simply extended the logic of Jones/Jardines to
persons.  And, in doing so, the Court resolved a pure case of
information security.  The only thing at issue in Grady was the
information about where Grady might go (geolocational data).
In holding that this collection of data trails constituted a
Fourth Amendment search, the Court made the primacy of
property give way to the primacy of informational security.
328 See Tracey Maclin, Government Analysis of Shed DNA Is a Search Under the
Fourth Amendment, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 287, 312 (2016); see also Joh, supra note
253, at 882 (“The collection of abandoned DNA by police threatens the privacy
rights of everyone.”); Albert E. Scherr, Genetic Privacy & the Fourth Amendment:
Unregulated Surreptitious DNA Harvesting, 47 GA. L. REV. 445, 526 (2013) (“[T]he
police conduct a search for Fourth Amendment purposes when they enter a cell,
its nucleus, and the DNA therein to get identity information.”).
329 Stephen Mercer & Jessica Gabel, Shadow Dwellers: The Underregulated
World of State and Local DNA Databases, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 639, 658
(2014) (“King did not directly address the collection, analysis, and retention of
DNA samples from persons who have not been arrested for or convicted of a
qualifying offense, leaving open the question of how the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies to crime victim, elimination, and suspect samples that have been volun-
teered to the police.”).
330 Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370 (2015).
331 Id. at 1370–71.
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Second, while the placement of the GPS band clearly in-
volved physical contact, the harm was not simply to dignity,332
but information-focused.  As a convicted sex-offender, Grady
was subject to far graver dignity harms than the placement of a
tracking band on his body.333  Instead, the constitutional ob-
jection recognized by the Court was the open-ended private
information being revealed through a never-ending data trail.
The search (as opposed to seizure) involved this private infor-
mational harm. Grady did not hold that the placement of a
device on his body alone was the search, but placement with
the intent to monitor the personal information about his
whereabouts.
Finally, Grady was not decided based on Katz considera-
tions.  The five concurring Justices from Jones could have used
the opportunity to decide on the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy of a GPS band worn by a convicted sex offender.  Instead,
in deciding the case by extending the logic of Jones/Jardines,
the Court appeared to accept that the tracking and interception
of one’s geolocational information through data trails was a
search of the person for Fourth Amendment purposes.
These cases support the argument that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects the informational security of persons.  In the
digital context, the informational security principles are
strongest when talking about personal health, family, associa-
tional, and geolocational information.  Whether from a smart
medical device or a consumer fitness tracker, the informational
security principles suggest that the Fourth Amendment covers
this personal data originating from the person.
4. Papers and Informational Security
The Fourth Amendment’s protection of papers presents the
most straightforward example of informational security. The
unifying theme connecting the papers in John Wilkes’s desk
and David Riley’s smartphone involves the informational value
332 See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847–49 (2006) (holding that
parolees enjoy a reduced reasonable expectation of privacy due to their status as
parolees).
333 See, e.g., Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of
Targeted, Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 373 (2014) (arguing
that noncustodial restraints “can impose a form of de facto imprisonment” on sex
offenders); Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitu-
tionality in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1122 (2012)
(arguing that sex offender statutes are excessively punitive); Eric S. Janus &
Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of
Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 338–59 (2003) (discussing sex
offenders and their substantive due process rights).
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of the documents, and not the format of memorializing those
ideas.334  The type of parchment or device matters little.  What
matters are the ideas revealed or recorded on those real and
digital papers.
In all of the analysis of papers throughout the Supreme
Court history, two themes emerge which largely support a
broad protection of informational security in papers (and digi-
tal papers).  First, the concern has never merely been the phys-
ical taking of papers; instead the concern has always been the
protection of the ideas embodied in those papers.335  Second,
the security of papers was to encourage free expression and
prevent self-censorship.336  This freedom of expression in-
cluded religious and political dissent,337 but was also a recog-
nition of the importance of intellectual growth encouraged by
the development of new ideas.338  Restrictions of such ideas not
only undermine democratic liberty, but could also cause psy-
chological harm that could be personally damaging.339
Whether the government physically scrolls through a
smartphone, looks in a desk, or virtually scans a computer, the
threat to informational freedom and personal autonomy is the
same.  In considering the informational security of papers, the
Court has always been concerned with securing a space of
protection free from government surveillance.  As such, be-
cause digital papers and attendant data trails reveal content of
communications and other private opinions, they should also
334 See supra section II.B.4 & subsection II.B.4.a.
335 Andrew J. DeFilippis, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right to
Privity in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1105 (2006)
(“Rather than merely prevent government seizure of the physical papers them-
selves, the Founders sought to prevent the broader harms associated with seizing
the potentially sensitive information contained therein.”).
336 Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193, 1260 (1998) (“Simply put, surveillance leads to self-censorship.”).
337 Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 434 (2008)
(“Government surveillance—even the mere possibility of interested watching by
the state—chills and warps the exercise of this interest.  This effect was under-
stood by the drafters of the Fourth Amendment, who grasped the relationship
between preventing government searches of papers and protecting religious and
political dissent.”).
338 Id. at 436 (“Intellectual records—such as lists of Web sites visited, books
owned, or terms entered into a search engine—are in a very real sense a partial
transcript of the operation of a human mind.  They implicate the freedom of
thought and the freedom of intellectual exploration.”).
339 Bradley, supra note 261, at 483 (“A search for private papers may be no
more physically intrusive than a search for a gun, but the psychological intrusion
is far greater, because the searcher is invading not only the subject’s house but
his or her thoughts as well.” (emphasis in original)).
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benefit from constitutional protections created to defend infor-
mation and ideas.
5. Informational Security from Constitutional Sources
A theme of respecting informational security can thus be
observed in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of effects,
houses, persons, and papers.  In the forgoing analysis, infor-
mational security is not an abstract concept, but arises from
those particular constitutionally referenced sources.  The
Fourth Amendment secures someone, something, or some-
where.  Information obtained from a constitutionally recog-
nized source—effects, houses, persons, papers—gains
derivative protection due to the source of the information.  Fo-
cusing attention on a derivative constitutional source provides
a useful and relatively easy guidepost to identify which types of
information deserve constitutional protection.
Such derivative protection also covers information at some
remove from the actual constitutionally protected interest.
Charlie Katz’s voice exited the closed glass door and was cap-
tured by the microphone taped on top of the phone booth.
Antoine Jones’s travel coordinates left the car and was cap-
tured by satellite technology.  David Riley’s smartphone com-
munications data existed both on the phone and outside of it
(in the cloud).  Yet, the protections of the Constitution carried
to these intangible, invisible, separate pieces of personal infor-
mation.  The constitutional protections of persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects might, thus, be better characterized as
protections of the information emanating from those constitu-
tionally protected interests.
B. Informational Security Defended
Informational security provides the organizing theory for
applying Fourth Amendment principles to the problem of smart
data.  The data trails from smart objects exist as pure informa-
tion.  When arising from constitutional sources such as effects,
houses, persons, and papers, this data lays claim to the Fourth
Amendment protections sketched out above.  The data be-
comes protected as an extension of the thing/place/person/
paper itself.  The data trail, if it is secured, and if it is the type of
information traditionally protected by the Constitution, gets to
claim this derivative, but equal, protection.
Why focus on security and not privacy?  The reliance on
the term “security” claims a long lineage in Fourth Amendment
tradition.  The constitutional text speaks of “the right of the
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people to be secure.”340  The Founding Fathers used the princi-
ple of security in many of their early writings.341  Professor Tom
Clancy and others have argued that security, not privacy, has
always been the controlling principle behind Fourth Amend-
ment law.342  In the Founders’ world of physical surveillance
and physical searches, the ability to physically exclude others
defined a sense of security.
Informational security reflects the recognition that physi-
cal security, while important, may be less important in a digital
age.  Building a curtilage wall will not protect you from invasive
visual, audio, and other surveillance.  Police no longer need to
break down your door to rummage through your papers when
technology allows them to do the same thing from the comfort
of their computers.343  Yet, the constitutional right to exclude
should remain, and the question for this Article and the larger
problem of data trails is how to secure some of this information
from the growing reach of sensorveillance.
The choice to rely on informational security is more limited
than the broader theoretical protection of informational pri-
vacy.344  Clearly privacy informs conceptions of security, but
privacy expands out with a far greater reach.  Privacy scholars
have ably framed a broad and deep conception of informational
340 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1 (emphasis added); see Jed Rubenfeld, The End
of Privacy, 61 STAN L. REV. 101, 104 (2008) (“The Fourth Amendment does not
guarantee a right of privacy.  It guarantees—if its actual words mean anything—a
right of security.”).
341 See Ferguson, supra note 63, at 1327–30 (discussing the history of being
“secure”).
342 See Clancy, supra note 109, at 322–23 (developing the concept of security R
as opposed to privacy as the controlling protection of the Fourth Amendment);
Thomas K. Clancy, The Importance of James Otis, 82 MISS. L.J. 487, 505 (2013)
(“The ability to exclude is so essential to the exercise of the right to be secure that
it is proper to say that it is equivalent to the right—the right to be secure is the
right to exclude.  Without the ability to exclude, a person has no security.  With
the ability to exclude, a person has all that the Fourth Amendment promises: no
unjustified intrusions by the government.  In other words, the Fourth Amendment
gives the right to say, ‘No,’ to the government’s attempts to search and seize.”).
343 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting) (warning how the Fourth Amendment can be violated without physical
seizure of information).
344 Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 231 (2005)
(“Informational privacy is rooted in the Fourth Amendment’s protection from un-
reasonable searches and seizures, as well as the conception of privacy outlined by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their famous 1890 article in the Harvard
Law Review, where they used the phrase ‘right to privacy’ to denote a constella-
tion of different interests, most of which involved the right not to have personal
information exposed to the general public.” (internal citations omitted)).
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privacy, with many different and important facets.345  Criminal
justice scholars have also provided alternative visions of a pri-
vacy/security paradigm.346  My concept of informational secur-
ity offers a more modest approach, involving more practical
concerns of exclusion, control, and access.  Both security and
privacy are important, but this Article emphasizes the former
over the latter.347
345 See, e.g., Richards, supra note 304, at 1134 (“ ‘Privacy’ is a particularly
troubling term to use in the database context.  On the one hand, virtually all
scholars agree that ‘privacy’ is a concept that has eluded definition despite innu-
merable efforts to the contrary.  On the other hand, privacy has come to be
associated with a wide variety of meanings in addition to control over personal
data, including residential solitude, rights of self-definition, freedom from govern-
ment surveillance, and fundamental rights to make autonomous decisions about
one’s body.”); David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not to Think About
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1107 (2014) (critiqu-
ing the idea of treating privacy as merely data flows and privacy as equivalent to
informational privacy); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:
Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 134–40 (2007) (discussing
the right to confidentiality in the United States); Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling
Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future, 105
NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2011) (arguing for a more comprehensive regime of
data security due to technological advances).
346 See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 18 (2007) (Proposing a test that looks at “whether law
enforcement’s proposed surveillance method is hidden, intrusive, continuous,
and indiscriminate . . . .”); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative
Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 71–72 (2013) (“[W]e argue here that Fourth Amend-
ment interests in quantitative privacy demand that we focus on how information
is gathered.  In our view, the threshold Fourth Amendment question should be
whether a technology has the capacity to facilitate broad and indiscriminate sur-
veillance that intrudes upon reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy by
raising the specter of a surveillance state if deployment and use of that technology
is left to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement officers or other government
agents.” (emphasis in original)); Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment Right to Delete,
119 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 10, 12 (2005) (“[W]hen an owner loses control of a copy of
her data, she loses the ability to dispose of or alter that data, which I contend
causes a form of seizure.  This is analogous to the property right to destroy, which
is tied to the rights of dominion and control.  The Fourth Amendment prohibition
on unreasonable seizure should protect these rights and provide a constitutional
right to delete.”); Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Techno-
logically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507,
546–48 (2005) (arguing that privacy is not an indivisible commodity).
347 Finally, the term “informational security” resonates with the related fields
of data protection and data security.  “Data protection” has been adopted as the
European conception of how best to consider data privacy.  In other contexts, the
term “informational security” relates to data breaches and other forms of guarding
data from private collection or criminal interception.  A world of informational
security professionals work to guard access to data, build firewalls, and limit
information from going to unintended sources.  Richards, supra note 304, at 1136
(“ ‘Data protection’ is a somewhat technical concept that participants in the Infor-
mation Privacy Law Project in the United States have used on occasion to describe
the problems associated with personal data.”).
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The next Part seeks to operationalize an approach to ana-
lyzing data trails through the prism of “informational curti-
lage.”  The task of identifying these unifying themes is not
meant to simplify the complexity of the Fourth Amendment.
Scholars have identified many other controlling principles—
dignity, respect, power, trust, intellectual privacy, legality—all
of which are a part of the Fourth Amendment.348  But, when
focused on the problem of data trails, the principle of informa-
tional security serves as a more helpful guide.  Part IV seeks to
articulate how to apply that principle to the puzzle of data
trails.
IV
INFORMATIONAL CURTILAGE
This Part develops a theory of the Fourth Amendment ap-
propriate for the digital age.  Building off the insight that infor-
mational security from constitutional sources provides a useful
and constitutionally legitimate means to protect smart data,
this Part adopts “informational curtilage” as a conceptual
framework to guide future Fourth Amendment analysis.
In two prior articles I developed the theory of “personal
curtilage” to carve out protection from “all seeing” surveillance
technology in the physical world349 and “digital curtilage” to
protect smart objects in a virtual world.350  This Article sug-
gests a global theory of “informational curtilage” to augment
those tests,351 but also to replace the physical intrusion/tres-
pass test and the reasonable expectation of privacy test cur-
rently in use.
348 See, e.g., Jeremy M. Miller, Dignity as a New Framework, Replacing the
Right to Privacy, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (human dignity); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 98
(2003) (respect); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman’s” Fourth Amendment: Privacy or
Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1775
(1994) (trust); Richards, supra note 337, at 444 (intellectual privacy); Raymond R
Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002) (“power not
privacy”).
349 Ferguson, supra note 63, at 1287–88. R
350 Ferguson, supra note 20, at 809. R
351 Upon reflection, I have come to the conclusion that my previous theory of
digital curtilage, see id., may be too narrow a conception to cover the range of data
related issues arising from the Internet of Things.  The effects-based approach
that undergirds digital curtilage may, in application, be too dependent on prop-
erty concepts, and not sufficiently attuned to the fact that data is better conceived
as information rather than property.  The reworking of digital curtilage into infor-
mational curtilage is a recognition that the focus should be more on the data
rather than the effect.
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“Curtilage,” as traditionally conceived, exists as a protec-
tive area around the home that secures the area from outside
interference or observation.352  Property and activities in this
area gain derivative protection from the primacy of the home.
As discussed earlier, the justification for this legal fiction353
was to develop a space for personal and familial development
free from outside intrusion.  Stripped down to its essentials,
curtilage is basically a recognition that certain constitutional
sources (i.e., homes) deserve protection if the occupant has
taken steps to build security (i.e., the symbolic curtilage wall),
in order to protect the private activities that happen in and
around the home.354  The Supreme Court’s test for physical
curtilage echoes those principles requiring an analysis of four
factors:
[W]e believe that curtilage questions should be resolved with
particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area
claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is in-
cluded within an enclosure surrounding the home, the na-
ture of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken
by the resident to protect the area from observation by people
passing by.355
Informational curtilage expands this concept from the home to
all of the constitutionally protected interests (persons, papers,
effects), and focuses on the informational content not the par-
ticular physical space.  Parallel to traditional curtilage, infor-
mational curtilage looks at the proximity/derivative connection
to the constitutional source, the steps taken to mark out or
protect the information, and the nature of the uses of that
information.
The theory of informational curtilage answers the thresh-
old question of whether the warrantless interception of data
trails is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Informa-
tional curtilage defines the threshold of a protected data trail—
the interception (and/or use) of which is a search.
352 United States v. Romano, 388 F. Supp. 101, 104 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (“The
word curtilage is derived from the Latin cohors (a place enclosed around a yard)
and the old French cortilliage or courtillage which today has been corrupted into
courtyard.  Originally it referred to the land and outbuildings immediately adja-
cent to a castle that were in turn surrounded by a high stone wall.  Today its
meaning has been extended to include any land or building immediately adjacent
to a dwelling.  Usually it is enclosed some way by a fence or shrubs.” (citations
omitted)).
353 Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 759 n.36 (2002)
(calling curtilage a legal fiction).
354 Ferguson, supra note 63, at 1314–22 (discussing the history of curtilage).
355 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
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A. The Theory of Informational Curtilage
The theory of informational curtilage provides an opera-
tional framework for courts to identify what information (in-
cluding which data trails) deserves Fourth Amendment
protection.  To gain protection under an informational curtilage
theory, three requirements must be met: (1) there must be a
connection to a constitutionally protected source; (2) there
must be a claim of security manifested by marking or securing
the information from others; and (3) there must be an examina-
tion of the nature of the uses of the information.  These require-
ments follow the traditional curtilage analysis well-established
in the case law.356  This subpart addresses how to define and
apply each of the three elements of the informational curtilage
theory.  Consistent with the project of this Article, the analysis
will focus on the problem of data trails, although the scope of
the theory is not so limited.
1. Connection to a Constitutionally Protected Source
As established, the constitutional protections of houses,
persons, papers, and effects have found a place of primacy in
Fourth Amendment doctrine.  Information (data) from those
sources also, therefore, deserves primary protection.
The theory of informational curtilage first asks whether the
information (data trails) at issue come from a home, a person,
papers, or personal effects.  Just as curtilage derives protection
from the protection of the home, informational curtilage derives
its protection from traditional constitutional sources.  As dis-
cussed in Part II, Fourth Amendment cases regularly follow
this approach.  In a non-digital case, courts easily embrace the
claim that because the information sought came from a person
(e.g., urine), home (e.g., heat), or papers (e.g., incriminating
documents), the Fourth Amendment applies.
The first step of an informational curtilage analysis merely
asks if the information derives from a constitutional source.  In
digital cases, if so linked to a constitutional source, the data
trails from that source will benefit from a derivative protection.
This would include content data, metadata,357 and all of the
digital exhaust that remains from digital communication.
Courts would merely look to see if the data trail came from one
356 See supra discussion at Part II.
357 See generally JEFFREY POMERANTZ, METADATA 3–13 (2015) (discussing the
role of metadata in everyday life).
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of these recognized constitutional sources.  If not, the data falls
outside of Fourth Amendment protection.
Analytically, this presents some differences in approach (if
not outcome) with the current doctrine.  Charlie Katz’s phone
call did not occur in his home or from his personal effects.358
The only way that the informational curtilage theory would
protect his communication would be to claim that the informa-
tion derived from his person.  Words coming from a person’s
mouth certainly qualify as information coming from a person.
At least at this first level of analysis, direct interception of con-
versations would be protected because they derive from the
textual protection of “persons”—a recognized constitutional
source.  Data trails from automobiles might be more protected
under an informational curtilage theory than a Katz analysis
because, while expectations of privacy in driving in public may
be limited,359 there is little doubt that cars are protected effects
for Fourth Amendment purposes.360  David Riley’s smartphone
data would be covered because it came from an effect.  Simi-
larly, Danny Kyllo’s extra heat would be covered because it
came from his home.  But, some objects in the Internet of
Things fall outside these textual sources and would not be
covered.361
Generally speaking, however, this first element of analysis
would provide a broad protection from direct interception.
Most data trails sought by investigative agents would likely
come from a person, home, effect, or papers.  While issues of
standing and control need to be examined (discussed next), the
first analytical element tracks existing Fourth Amendment un-
derstandings applied to the digital world.
2. A Claim of Security
The second step of analysis asks whether the information
has been secured in such a way to establish a barrier of con-
trol.  Parallel to the curtilage wall erected to symbolically or
358 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967).
359 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) (holding that “[a]
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another”); see also
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715–16 (1984) (describing whether property
that has been withdrawn from public view is relevant to reasonable expectation of
privacy).
360 See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing Jones’ car as an
effect).
361 Potentially most third-party sensors would fall outside of this protection.
Direct interception of information from a smart device would be protected, but not
the same interception from a third-party sensor.
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literally mark out the curtilage, steps taken to protect the infor-
mation from interception would be honored as a statement of
security.  What matters are the steps made to symbolize exclu-
sion of others, rather than the reality of actually excluding
others.  After all, the fact that police can break in and defeat the
security of a locked home does not undermine the constitu-
tional protection of that home.  The focus is again on informa-
tional control, rather than complete informational privacy.
The principle of informational security (discussed through-
out this Article) can now do some real analytical work.  As has
been established, in the non-digital world, a defining aspect of
what has been protected turned on what had been secured
from others.362  Justice Scalia’s property preference rests im-
plicitly on the property principle of exclusion.363  Antoine Jones
could control who could interfere with this car.  Similarly,
Katz’s statement that “what [one] seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitution-
ally protected,”364 the closed container doctrine, or the protec-
tion of the home, all turn on securing the information against
another’s access.365  The key has always been whether one has
attempted to exclude others from access to the information
sought.366  Hopping over a curtilage wall does not defeat the
constitutional statement of security.  One does not need a
moat, only a symbolic wall marking out the area of security.
Security becomes even more important in the digital world.
The theory of informational curtilage looks to see the steps
taken to retain control over data or exclude others from data.  A
court would examine the practical, technological, legal, and
other steps taken to ensure that data trails have been secured
from others.  The analysis would necessarily work along a con-
tinuum, with little to no protection for information freely
shared with others (commenting through a public Twitter ac-
count), to more protection for users who controlled locational
data access, restricted data sharing, and used encrypted ser-
362 Cf. Sklansky, supra note 345, at 1107 (describing privacy as “refuge,” “[t]he
notion that each of us needs ‘a private enclave’—locations and aspects of our lives
that are shielded from public scrutiny—may be a product of modernity, but it is so
deeply entrenched that it has become part of what it means for a life to be well led
and for a society to be well constituted” (internal citations omitted)).
363 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
364 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967).
365 See supra note 195.
366 Cf. William C. Heffernan, Property, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 60
BROOK. L. REV. 633, 643 (1994) (“What is critical to informational privacy, then, is
not the presence of a physical ‘shell’ that contains facts about someone’s life, but
an individual’s control over the dissemination of the facts themselves.”).
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vices, to absolute protection for people technologically savvy
enough to use key encryption or establish contractual arrange-
ments to secure data.  Choices in data settings might signify
security.  Particular privacy policies might suggest limited ac-
cess to others.  Even temporary choices to turn off locational
tracking or enhance privacy settings might be significant.  The
question will no longer be about expectations but about ac-
tions, and courts will need to examine the particular actions of
the target.
Practically, this means that not all data trails will be
granted Fourth Amendment protection.  My smart umbrella
which informs me about the weather might be secured if I have
established settings to only share my locational data with the
weather service, but not if any locational tracking device or
service can find my umbrella.  My smart car data might be
secured if the contractual arrangement with my car company
states that it will only use the data to alert me to repairs or in a
service emergency, but not if I choose to share my car’s location
with everybody who offers me consumer assistance or services.
Notice the issue is not whether I have given up privacy to one
entity (and thus privacy to all entities), but how I have con-
trolled access to my personal information.  If the owner of the
data takes steps to control the data and exclude others, then
they can claim a measure of security over that data against
others, including the government.
Of course, data trails are generated from sensors occasion-
ally embedded (and sometimes hidden) in ordinary objects or
devices.367  Some devices will not be sophisticated enough to
allow for controlling security features.368  This technological
limitation provides a significant constitutional limitation on
data arising from the Internet of Things.  Further, it might limit
the protection of metadata or other digital signals unknowingly
produced by the user.  While metadata theoretically may gain
protection because it derives from a constitutionally protected
effect, as a practical matter it may not easily be secured.  This
is a big gap in coverage, and it is one that may not satisfy civil
liberties advocates interested in more complete protection for
metadata and related information.  It also places a significant
burden on those not technologically savvy enough to under-
stand the security features on a smart device.  Admittedly, un-
fair distinctions based on class and education may result in
different levels of protection because of technological expertise.
367 See Shackelford et al., supra note 82, at 1, 14. R
368 Id. at 14, 16.
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In fact, all but the most technologically sophisticated user
would likely reveal certain information as the unintentional
byproduct of using particular technology.
This limitation, while real, may lead to a technological so-
lution.  As technology advances, many devices will allow users
to control access to the information (even as default settings).
If the concept of “informational curtilage” becomes adopted,
companies may design products for such data security con-
trol.369  In any event, users would not need to disable all such
communications to retain security, but merely make an at-
tempt to control access against intrusion.  A curtilage wall has
always allowed friendly guests to visit when asked, and such
specific access does not also require general access for those
not invited.  Unlike expectations of privacy, which leads to the
third-party doctrine exposure, security can be controlled, mod-
ulated, and enhanced by the individual.
Courts looking to see if the user has established a claim of
security will look at the source of the data trail to see what the
user has done to claim a measure of security.  Did they allow
open access to their data?  Did they use encryption?  Did they
manifest through contractual arrangements or any other
mechanisms, intent to keep this information secure?370  The
test will be objective because, of course, at the time of the
judicial inquiry the person challenging the Fourth Amendment
search will claim a subjective desire for security.  But courts
can look to see what steps had been taken to preserve this
information from general consumption and interception.
This approach also has application in the physical world.
In fact, the concept is so embedded in our lives that we do not
notice it as a claim of informational security.  We design houses
with window shades and wear clothes that do not reveal our
bodies.  Those coverings exist to hide the information inside
our homes and underneath our clothes.  By securing the infor-
mation from others, we demonstrate a claim to informational
security.  And, importantly, what is different about informa-
tional security compared to privacy is that even if the blinds are
369 Apple and Google have recently re-designed smartphones with new encryp-
tion software in response to weak legal protection of consumer data. See Joe
Miller, Google and Apple to Introduce Default Encryption, BBC (Sept. 19, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-29276955 [https://perma.cc/8UR4-
T9SH].
370 Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
611, 614–16 (2015) (importing fiduciary norms and duties to protect third-party
information).
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slightly open,371 or even if backscatter (x-ray-like) technology
can see through our clothes, a claim to security protects us,
even if we objectively have lost a measure of privacy.  Individu-
als can control security through affirmative actions, and these
actions do not depend on generalized understandings of
privacy.
Such an information-based approach can be used to re-
think seminal Fourth Amendment cases with sometimes differ-
ent outcomes.  By closing the glass door and paying his toll,
Charlie Katz signified his expectation of informational secur-
ity.372  By securing his trash in an opaque bag on his curtilage,
Billy Greenwood could make a strong claim of informational
security because he took steps to secure his property from
others.373  By building fences and a mostly enclosed green-
house on his property, Michael Riley could claim informational
security from aerial surveillance.374  These cases and others
would now turn on the steps symbolizing security that the
property owner took to protect the activities or information
arising from these constitutionally recognized spaces.  While
only one factor in the informational curtilage test, this attempt
to secure information as private would provide a stronger pro-
tection than the reasonable expectation of privacy test.
This reality opens up a related question about Fourth
Amendment standing.375  The current Fourth Amendment law
relies on rather circular logic.  If you have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the thing searched or seized, you can assert
standing to suppress based on a violation of your reasonable
expectation of privacy.376  So a driver can assert standing in
the search of her car, but a passenger with no ownership inter-
est in that car cannot.377  Because the informational curtilage
theory exists separately from the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test, standing must be addressed.
371 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87 (1998).
372 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
373 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
374 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 463 (1989).
375 See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 259 (2007) (discussing a car
passenger’s standing under the Fourth Amendment despite the car belonging to
someone else); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138–39 (1978) (explaining that a
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights are “invariably intertwined [with the] con-
cept of standing”); see also Sarah L. Dickey, The Anomaly of Passenger “Standing”
to Suppress All Evidence Derived from Illegal Vehicle Seizures Under the Exclusion-
ary Rule: Why the Conventional Wisdom of the Lower Courts Is Wrong, 82 MISS.
L.J. 183, 189 (2013) (providing background on the history of standing in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence).
376 See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139.
377 Id.
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Fortunately, the informational security principle addresses
standing and ownership.  Individuals who make a valid claim
to informational security have standing irrespective of property
ownership.  Those who have the right to exclude others have
the right to claim that right against the government for Fourth
Amendment purposes.  In fact, this principle is stronger than
the current standing doctrine.  If a claim of security were made,
a lawful passenger could have the ability to exclude arresting
officers from possessions in a car and thus have standing to
contest the search.378  After all, with the consent of the driver, a
lawful passenger could exclude other uninvited guests ranging
from hitchhikers to drunken friends from getting into a car.  If a
claim of security were made, short-term business associates in
an apartment would be able to exclude others and thus claim
security over the premises.379  Even those individuals using
private homes for commercial (and even illegal) operations
could exclude neighbors and others from joining them.380
Again, the issue would be what individuals did to claim a con-
stitutionally recognized area as secure from others.  A valid
claim of informational security would equate to a valid claim of
Fourth Amendment standing.
3. Nature and Uses of Data
The third factor in the informational curtilage framework
turns on the nature of the uses of the data at issue.  Not all
information deserves Fourth Amendment protection, and the
line drawn by the informational curtilage theory looks at the
nature of the uses of the data.
The key is to look at why a particular constitutional inter-
est is protected and why an attempt at security has been made.
In a traditional curtilage analysis, the nature of the uses of the
area became a factor because traditional curtilage existed to
promote family and personal development around the home.381
In constitutionalizing curtilage, the Supreme Court extended
the surrounding areas that acted to protect these home-like/
family uses.  In the digital realm, the question becomes
whether the data trail comes from a home or something that
supports home-like activities.  Data from a Nest Learning Ther-
378 The focus is on the search of the car, not the seizure. Compare id. (analyz-
ing a third party’s rights after an allegedly unlawful search of the owner’s car) with
Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 249 (analyzing a third party’s rights after an unlawful stop of
the owner’s car).
379 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87 (1998).
380 See id.
381 See supra notes 353–54 and accompanying text.
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mostat or equivalent would qualify because it reveals patterns
of home life activities.  Most of the smart home efficiencies
(smart toasters, refrigerators, toothbrushes), in fact, would be
protected because of the long-standing protection of data from
homes.  Courts would merely need to evaluate whether the
nature of the uses of smart data from homes supports why we
protect homes in the first place.
Importantly, the nature of constitutional interests is not
the same.  The protection of Fourth Amendment papers is less
about family and home and more about personal, professional,
or political expression.382  A court examining whether digital
papers should be protected under an informational curtilage
theory would ask, not whether the data functions to protect the
interests of curtilage (family/personal autonomy, etc.), but
whether it protects the interests of papers (expression/creative
freedom, business, dissent, etc.).383  If so, then the nature and
uses would be analogous and applicable.  Under this analysis,
encrypted email, notes, calendars, bank records, prescriptions,
etc. would all be protected from direct interception, just like
their non-digital counterparts.  If the digital papers are the
equivalent of ordinary Fourth Amendment “papers,” they
would fulfill the requirement of being the types of data that
should be protected.
Similarly, a court examining whether to protect the data
trails coming from persons—for example, a “smart” heart stent
embedded in a patient—would ask whether the nature of the
uses was the same as why the Fourth Amendment protects
persons.  Issues of human dignity, personal autonomy, and
private health would suggest that such a protection should
exist.  Most smart medical devices would likely qualify for pro-
tection, as would most effects that revealed biological or health
information.
Oddly, the hardest constitutional source to analyze might
be effects.  A court examining whether we should protect the
data coming from a smart umbrella would need to ask why the
382 See supra discussion at section II.B.4.
383 This insight provides an important difference between the theories of “in-
formational curtilage” and “digital curtilage.” See Ferguson, supra note 20, at
866–68.  Informational curtilage takes a broader view of the nature and uses of all
of the constitutional sources in the text of the Fourth Amendment.  The reason we
protect persons is not the same as the reason we protect property.  The theory of
digital curtilage did not make that concession, adopting a more literal reading of
the curtilage analogy.  Informational curtilage takes its analogy not from the prop-
erty concepts of curtilage but from the reasons why we protect persons, papers,
and effects.  It is thus a more expansive analysis of how curtilage principles
should be applied to the digital world.
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Fourth Amendment would protect a traditional effect. Both
property and privacy considerations arise.  In a prior article, I
suggested that only effects associated with personal or private
matters would deserve protection, relying on the Founders’
preference to protect items found in homes.384  This distinction
presents some difficult line drawing that upon further reflec-
tion may be too limited.  After all, Antoine Jones’ car (effect)
was considered protected.  A broader understanding of pro-
tected effects may need to be created to address the expanding
role of smart devices in our lives.
Yet, candidly the question of what types of smart effects
should be protected has no easy answer.  Courts will need to
examine the type of effect at issue and determine whether the
information from this type of effect deserves constitutional pro-
tection.  A smart fork that reveals how fast you eat might get
more protection than a smart tire that reveals the air pressure
on your car.  A smart fertility tracker might get more protection
than a smart air filter that reports the toxins in the air.  How-
ever, as detailed in Part II, the protection of unconcealed effects
in public has never been robust, and thus protection of smart
data from those effects may also be comparatively weak.
***
The theory of informational curtilage requires an analysis
of all three elements, although in practice they regularly over-
lap.  Any analysis of the nature and uses will raise an initial
question of whether the data comes from a constitutionally
protected space.  Issues of what steps have been taken to se-
cure the information might also inform the nature and uses
question.  And, of course, just because information comes from
a constitutionally protected source and is consistent with the
nature and uses of that source does not mean that the informa-
tion will be protected; if no effort at security has been made,
then there may be no protection.
Courts looking to answer the ultimate question of whether
particular data trails are protected by the Fourth Amendment
will need to ask: (1) if the data came from a constitutionally
protected source (persons, houses, papers, or effects); (2) if the
information was secured in some manner to symbolically or
literally to exclude others; and (3) if the nature and uses of the
384 See id. at 870–72; Davies, supra note 107, at 714 (describing how originally R
the Fourth Amendment “was understood to provide clear protection for houses,
personal papers, the sorts of domestic and personal items associated with houses,
and even commercial products or goods that might be stored in houses” (emphasis
added)).
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data connects back to why we protect that particular constitu-
tional interest in the first place.  If the answer is yes to all
questions, then the information is protected by the Fourth
Amendment.  If not, then the data falls outside of Fourth
Amendment protection under an informational curtilage
theory.
B. Capture and Collection
The final issue involves the capture of information.  If the
capture of data trails invades the threshold established by in-
formational curtilage, it is a Fourth Amendment search.  Infor-
mational curtilage provides a different threshold test, but the
analysis tracks ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis.  The
question that remains, however, is whether law enforcement’s
capture of data must have been purposeful.
One of the complicated realities of sensorveillance is that
the data streams exist all around us and can be intercepted
inadvertently or for non-investigatory purposes.  For example,
during a natural disaster or fire, police might want to know the
location of cellphone signals in an apartment building.  Inter-
cepting those signals would not be for investigatory purposes
but emergency rescue.385  If police officials needed to stagger
traffic flow on a damaged bridge or during rush hour, inter-
cepting data trails from cars might be considered a non-investi-
gatory purpose.386  More controversial examples might include
intercepting information about prescriptions to warn of tainted
medicine or intercepting energy usage to regulate electricity
consumption during a severe heat wave.
This reality complicates the constitutional analysis, be-
cause the Supreme Court has been of two minds about the role
of “purpose” behind Fourth Amendment searches.  On one
hand, the Supreme Court in Grady stated, “ ‘the Fourth
Amendment’s protection extends beyond the sphere of criminal
investigations,’ and the government’s purpose in collecting in-
formation does not control whether the method of collection
constitutes a search.”387
385 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006) (discussing the
public safety exception to the Fourth Amendment).
386 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997) (“When . . . ‘special
needs’—concerns other than crime detection—are alleged in justification of a
Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts must undertake a context-specific inquiry,
examining closely the competing private and public interests advanced by the
parties.”).
387 Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
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On the other hand, Fourth Amendment case law has often
examined the purpose of police activity to determine whether it
implicates constitutional rights.388  In ordinary cases, the pur-
pose is readily apparent as police officers are affirmatively in-
vestigating criminal activity.  The vast majority of Fourth
Amendment cases involve police officers targeting allegedly
suspicious activities, suspicious people, or identified individu-
als or places of crime.  Further, this purpose has been extended
to non-criminal, civil cases involving civil regulation.389  While
not without internal conflict, civil investigations for regulatory
compliance can trigger the Fourth Amendment when impacting
constitutionally protected spaces.  In these less traditional
cases, the Supreme Court has looked to the investigatory pur-
pose as a means of deciding the reasonableness of a search.
Drug testing programs have been struck down when closely
tied with criminal investigations390 and permitted when fo-
cused on employment consequences.391  Automobile check-
points have been held to be unconstitutional when the
“primary purpose” existed to investigate crimes392 and permit-
ted when the purpose was deemed regulatory in nature.393
Outside the traditional “special needs” exceptions, the Su-
preme Court has excused police when acting as community
caretakers,394 emergency responders,395 or in other regulatory
388 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (“[W]e decline to
approve a program whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from
the general interest in crime control.”).
389 See Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 537–39 (1967)
(explaining that the Fourth Amendment permits searches for certain civil admin-
istrative and public safety purposes).
390 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001).
391 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989).
392 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
393 See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004) (upholding information-
seeking traffic stops); see also Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
451 (1990) (upholding police checkpoint stops for the purpose of preventing
drunk driving).
394 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (“Numerous state and federal
cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers
from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that
a person within is in need of immediate aid.”); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
441 (1973) (“Local police officers . . . frequently investigate vehicle accidents in
which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what . . . may be
described as community caretaking functions . . . .”).
395 Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006) (“[P]olice may enter a
home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believ-
ing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such
injury.”).
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roles.396  The analytical dividing line has turned on examining
whether or not the police action was done to investigate crimi-
nal/civil infractions or for some other governmental reason.
Further, as discussed in Part II, the Court in Jones,
Jardines, and Grady emphasized that a search occurred when
a constitutionally protected effect, home, or person was used to
obtain information about that source.  Explicit in the “use”
analysis was that the police had the purpose to investigate.  In
Jones, the Court wrote, “It is important to be clear about what
occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied pri-
vate property for the purpose of obtaining information.”397
Scalia continued in a footnote to reiterate, “Trespass alone does
not qualify, but there must be conjoined with that what was
present here: an attempt to find something or to obtain informa-
tion.”398  In Jardines, the Court wrote, “the question before the
court is precisely [whether] the officer’s conduct was an objec-
tively reasonable search.  As we have described, that depends
upon whether the officers had an implied license to enter the
porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they
entered.”399  In Grady, the Court cited the purpose language in
Jones and stated, “In light of these decisions, it follows that a
State also conducts a search when it attaches a device to a
person’s body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that
individual’s movements.”400
While the Supreme Court has stated that “governmental
purpose” is not controlling, these lines of cases, involving tradi-
tional investigation and special needs investigation, share the
commonality that they focus on the “purpose” of investigating
wrongdoing.  Because of that suggestion, the theory of informa-
tional curtilage follows this guidance.  Under an informational
curtilage theory, courts must ask whether the data was col-
lected for the purpose of investigating criminal or civil wrong-
doing.  All direct surveillance would count.  Most indirect
surveillance that occurred during ongoing criminal investiga-
tions would count.  Information collected under the pretext of a
non-criminal investigation, but which is plainly a backdoor at-
396 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997); see also Camara v. Mun.
Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 537–39 (1967).
397 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (emphasis added).
398 Id. at 951 n.5 (emphasis added).
399 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416–17 (2013) (emphasis added).
400 Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370 (2015) (emphasis added).
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tempt at criminal investigation would count.401  Some civil reg-
ulation by quasi-law enforcement agencies would count.
However, certain non-investigatory collection might fall outside
this law enforcement purpose.
CONCLUSION
This Article has offered a path forward to apply the Fourth
Amendment to the problem of data trails.  In a world that needs
both smart devices and the Fourth Amendment, there also
needs to be a new theory to protect the data trails we leave
behind.  Without such a theory, data trails will exist outside of
Fourth Amendment protection, and an intrusive sensor sur-
veillance system will be created without any constitutional re-
straints.  Informational curtilage provides a workable test to
distinguish the types of data that should be protected.  As a
test it emphasizes security over privacy and ex ante individual
notice over ex post judicial review, and it provides a flexible
balancing framework to allow for judicial discretion.
Equally important, theorizing data trails draws attention to
the principle of informational security that underlies all of
Fourth Amendment doctrine.  While minimized in the case law
and in tension with the property-focused direction of recent
cases, informational security offers a superior analytical frame
to understand why the Fourth Amendment protects certain
things, areas, ideas, activities, and people.  This article has
sought to reclaim this insight and highlight it for courts and
scholars.  As new technologies develop in the Internet of Things
and beyond, the hope is that these informational security prin-
ciples can be applied to keep the Fourth Amendment smart
enough to adapt to these challenges.
401 See Mills v. District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(finding neighborhood checkpoints for automobile safety an attempt to avoid a
constitutional prohibition of checkpoints for law enforcement purposes).
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